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Draft Recommandatian
on the dwelopment of Eost-Wut relations and Western European security
The Assembly,
(t) Considering that the new policy of reforms started in the Soviet Union four years ago has now
created conditions allowing decisive progress to be made towards a negotiated limitation of armaments,
the opening and development of a sincere dialogue and a wide spectrum of co-operation between the
countries of Eastern and Western Europe;(it) Noting that, after the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the opening of the conference on
chemical disarmament and adoption of the mandate of the conference on conventional disarmament
offer prospects of a general reduction in the level of armaments in Europe;(iiil Welcoming the Soviet Union's effort to base armaments reduction negotiations on gtreater
openness by publishing accurate, detailed information on Soviet military strength and to prepare data
that are effectively comparable with those provided by the western countries and also welcoming the
first unilateral measures to reduce Soviet troop levels in Eastern Europe;(iv) Noting with satisfaction that many conflicts in the world calmed down in 1988;(v) Welcoming the exchanges started between the WEU Assembly and the Supreme Soviet of the
Soviet Union;(vt) Taking into account the fact that the new Soviet concept of 'reasonable sufficiency'has not yet
been translated into specffic measures and cannot therefore yet be considered irreversible, but hoping
the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments will be successful;(viil Noting further that the new deployment and reorganisation of Soviet forces are still far from com-
plete and awaiting the implementation of the defensive strategy, the principle of which has been pro-
posed by the Soviet Union;
(viii) Welcoming the participation of the Soviet Union and its allies in all efforts by the international
community designed to restore or strenglhen peace in areas where it is threatened and to avoid nuclear
proliferation,
Rrcourrlrr.ros rHAT rnr CorrNcrr
1. Follow closely the evolution of the strategy, organisation and deplolment of Soviet forces and
report to the Assembly on the conclusions it draws from its analysis;
2. Compare the tables of the two alliances' forces and arms published by NATO and the Warsaw
Pact to explain existing differences between the figures quoted by the two sides;
3. For each of the negotiations on limiting s1 lanning armaments in which member countries are
participating, hold consultations between their delegations so as to co-ordinate their position on the
basis of the principles defined in the platform of The Hague;
4. Hold close consultations with its American allies in order to:
(a) defne ways and means of introducing a new security concept which ensures that no part of
Europe has its security diminished or made inferior to that of others;
(b) define a security system based on the maintenance of conventional and nuclear means at the
necessary level to avoid deterrence being circumvented;
(c/ conduct a redefinition of burdens and responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance with a view
to a multilateral approach to security;
(d) determne the requirements for effective verffication of the application of agreements on con-
ventional and chemical annaments;
(e) take no steps contrary to commitments entered into or liable to jeopardise further progress in
the negotiations on fts limitation of conventional annaments;
5. Urge the earliest possible resumption of the START negotiations;
6. In the framework of the Council of Europe, promote an active dialogue on all matters for which it
is responsible with all appropriate Eastern European countries fuIfilling the conditions and expressing
the desire to take part;
7. In all appropriate forums, promote the development of exchanges of all kinds between Western
Europe and the Eastern European countries and a rapprochement between those countries and all




(submitted by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteut)
I. Intoduction
l. Since 1947, Western Europe has been
facing a major threat from a powerfully-armed
Soviet Union which conveys a message radically
hostile to pluralist democratic r6gimes, occupies
half of Europe and encourages many subversive
movements throughout the world. It pursued its
external policy like a strategy designed to win a
decisive victory over international capitalism.
Periods of relative detente in East-West relations
were merely tactical changes, i.e. changes in pri-
orities in the use of various means to ensure this
victory, but no one gave serious thought to trans-
forming the ensuing peaceful coexistence into
true peace based on each party's freedom to
determine its own r6gime.
2. The existence of this permanent threat was
a decisive stimulus to everything concerned with
the building of Europe and led directly to the
conclusion of the 1949 Washington Treaty, the
subsequent establishment of NATO and serious
efforts by all the western countries to ensure their
security.
3. However, the policy pursued by the Soviet
Union since 1986 shows that the shape of threats
to Western Europe has changed to such an extent
that it might now be wondered whether they still
exist. A number of statements by Mr. Gorbachev
and the Soviet authorities, including some spec-
tacular measures, are intended to convince the
West that the Soviet Union has renounced its
previous political objectives, that it has pro-
foundly changed its strategy and that the main
aim of its external policy is now to organise
lasting peace based on disarmament, the liber-
alisation of trade and individual freedom.
Western Europeans who believe they can discern
less disinterested and peaceful aims behind the
Soviet attitude, in particular that of stirring up
opinion in the West against the governments,
Europe against the United States and European
countries against each other so as to ruin the
structures established in the West since the
second world war are finding it increasingly dif-
ficult to make themselves heard. It is becoming
more difficult to adopt defence budgets in par-
liament and, since 1986, the proportion of gross
national product earmarked for defence has been
falling each year in most western countries even
before major arms limitation negotiations are
concluded or even started.
4. Clearly the West cannot remain indifferent
to Soviet initiatives, particularly when they
produce results that conform to the aspirations
of all and requests often made by the West in the
past. Reductions in the level of forces, unilateral
disarmament measures, the settlement of many
conflicts outside Europe and the evacuation of
Afghanistan are undeniable facts. There can be
no question of acting as if they have not taken
place and should the governments decide to do
so they would not secure public support. Nor
must the West act as if there is no longer a threat,
as if there has been significant disarmament and
as if peace has been ensured throughout the
world. On the one hand, there are still many
ambiguous aspects to Soviet policy and it is,
moreover, far from certain that it will last for
very long. On the other hand, the Soviet Union
is not the only source of threats to Europe's
security and world peace.
5. Your Rapporteur will therefore first
attempt to assess these threats in their present
form. He will then examine what Europe can and
should do to counter them, while contributing to
peace, disarmament and the establishment of a
fairer, more stable international order.
6. Your Rapporteur visited the Soviet Union
from 17th to 21st April 1989 with a view to pre-
paring the present report. He was received by the
Suprerne Soviet and met all the Soviet author-
ities he had asked to meet. He was able to hold
detailed talks with them during which most of
his questions were answered very frankly. He
wishes to convey his warmest gratitude to
everyone in the Soviet Union who helped to
arrange and ensure the success of this visit,
including officials who received him and who are
listed at appendix to the rePort.
II. Transformations in the Sovict Union
7. Several Soviet authorities whom your
Rapporteur met and who were very favourable
to Mr. Gorbachev's reform policy stressed that
the idea of perestroika was not due to one man
but had arisen out of necessity. They believed
Mr. Gorbachev to be a striking embodiment, to
which they all paid tribute, of a decisive turning
point in Soviet history but he was not the
inventor of perestroika. It may be note4
moreover, that Mr. Gorbachev himself, in his
book " Perestroika o', shows himself to be more a
bearer of a message for which he is not wholly
responsible than the creator of a new regime. Ifjustified, this remark is not without 5ignificance
iince it limits the speculation sometimes
reported in the western press about the political
risks of Mr. Gorbachevos career. Although risk
there may be, it should not call in question many
aspects of the reforms that have been started.
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8. Nevertheless, it was the appointment of
Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the
Soviet Communist Party in March 1985 that
allowed the Soviet Union to show a different face
to the one the entire world had hitherto known.
As soon as he came to power, Mr. Gorbachev
presented himself as the man of change who
advocated a policy of far-reaching reforms in
every aspect of Soviet policy.
9. In both substance and form, there is a
Gorbachev style, but it was possible to use and
express this style because of particularly
favourable circumstances resulting from the con-junction oftwo factors: the general context ofthe
aging leadership, on the one hand, and the will to
remove the Soviet Union from the " pre-crisis "
state into which it had been plunged by pro-
longed, attenuated forms of Stalinism that con-
tinued for thirty years after Stalin's death. The
belief in the superiority of communism as a
system of economic management, the base of
Khrushchev's reforms, had disappeared long
before. By 1985, the sole aim was to bring the
Soviet economy and technology up to the same
level as the modern countries. To this end,
Mr. Gorbachev hinged his policy on two funda-
mental principles: perestroika, or restructuring,
and glasnost, or openness, considered to be an
instrument of restructuring.
10. Perestroika stemmed from realisation of
the economic, social and cultural decline of the
Soviet Union and the will to reverse this trend.Mr. Gorbachev therefore embarked upon a
policy of radical reorganisation of the state
machinery and the economy and adaptation of
ideology to new circumstances.
11. The main aim of changes in the state
machinery was to replace party officials by
enlarging and rejuvenating the Politburo and
also by replacing officials at every level, in par-
ticular in the republics, so that those who were
elected were more representative of society and
therefore had greater authority.
12. Naturally, this aspect of the reforms
directly affects those occupying these posts and
seems to be running into difficulties. Mr. Gor-
bachev seems to have made skilfirl use of cir-
cumstances in order to remove opposition to
perestroika in various areas: for instance, the
Chernobyl affair, the landing of a light aircraft in
Red Square and the decision to reduce conven-
tional forces led to sanctions or to resignations
which facilitated the replacement of leaders. But
ideological statements are difficult to interpret
because they contain elements which seem con-
tradictory to a western observer. On the one
hand, there is reference to continuity with the
work of Lenin, in itself ambiguous since Lenin, a
statesman, spoke in different terms depending on
whether revolution was necessary or the war
economy had to be ended and economic activity
reactivated, but nevertheless his work was set in
the context ofcontinuing the processs started by
the l9l7 revolution. On the other hand, prin-
ciples of a market economy or even pluralist
democracy are invoked in order to muster forces
in favour of perestroika. The facts themselves are
ambiguous. In January 1989, the freeing of prices
was deferred. Was this merely because the many
shortages meant that such action involved risks
for the currency and social stability? Was it to
silence political opposition? Similarly, giving the
electorate some degree of choice of candidates at
the elections to the Supreme Soviet held in April
1989 may just as well be a first step towards a
multi-party system as a manoeuvre to save the
single-party principle.
13. On 26th March, elections were held as
planned for part of the People's Congress of Dep-
uties. There was a searching public discussion
about the candidature of Boris Eltsin, leader of
the reformers, the popular choice of Moscow
electors, and other progressives who presented
themselves in many constituencies. These dis-
cussions and the accompanying popular demon-
strations showed that a large proportion of
Soviet public opinion was in favour of the
reform policy. Clearly, therefore, this appeal to
the public to face up to the reservations, criti-
cisms or ill will of conservative elements still
firmly ensconced in the state and party lead-
ership was wanted and accomplished by Mr.
Gorbachev under his responsibility.
14. It is admittedly too early to foresee all the
consequences ofthese elections and to assert that
there is a move towards a multi-party system.
For the time being, it is merely a relative diversi-
fication within a political system based on a
single party. However, it may be concluded thatMr. Gorbachev, following the example of
western leaders, has consolidated his power by
basing his authority on public opinion in order
to challenge the conservative elements hostile to
perestroika. Moreover, in his speech in London
on 7th April, Mr. Gorbachev clearly described
his interpretation of the choices of the Soviet
people:
* The election of people's deputies of the
USSR, which were held in a democratic
atmosphere unprecedented in our entire
history, has demonstrated that Soviet
people are not going to turn off the path
chosen four years ago... We launched
perestroika with our eyes open... We
realised that it would shake up thoroughly
our entire society... We are convinced that
only through democratisation is it possible
to build a well-functioning, healthy and
dynamic economy. "
However, in the majority of electoral constitu-
encies, there was nevertheless only one can-
didate, appointed by the local party organs, and
the majority of the new Supreme Soviet might
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remain under conservative control. There is thus
a risk that, after elections showing a prepon-
derance of reformers, the latter would be in a
minority in parliament. There might therefore be
a goyernment of reform backed by a majority of
the public opposite a Supreme Soviet that is, to
say the least, reserved about government policy.
In short, the very nature of Mr. Gorbachev's
political planning and the possible effects of his
action raise questions involving both internal
matters and foreign policy.
15. Where economic changes are concerned,
what is new is the depth of Mr. Gorbachev's diag-
nosis of the level of development in the Sorriet
Union and the way he has dramatised the coun-
try's economic setbacks: this was the r6le of
glasnost. The purpose was to break with the
practice of announcing to the people programmes
designed to give them the products and housing
they expected, showing off the Soviet Union to
world public opinion as a model of economic effi-
ciency but concealing the real statistics, bad man-
agement and even accidents, and turning a blind
eye to comrption. Accelerated development is
therefore now gaining a high degree of political,
economic and social significance.
16. To do this, Mr. Gorbachev is therefore
proposing to mobilise society, modernise the
machinery of production and reorganise the
system of economic administration. Company
law, an essential cog in the new economic
machinery, came into force on lst January 1988
after being approved by the Central Committee
in June 1987. This reform, which increases com-
panies' margin for manoeuwe by freeing them
from the cumbersome supervision of centralised
bureaucracy, should allow purely administrative
methods to be replaced by an economic concept
of management. This reform also involves the
rationalisation of the production cycle, the
closure of less profitable firms, the development
of small firms, co-operation with western firms
abroad, the modernisation of equipment, the
rationalisation of working methods and wages
policy. Mr. Gorbachev's recent review of agricul-
tural policy also revealed a disastrous situation
and he expressed the firm wish to put an end to
collective farming so as to make Soviet peasants
" masters of the land ".
17. Glasnost or openness, designed to con-
vince the people ofthe need for change and then
to release the creative potential that everyone has
in him, is the keynote of a new information and
cultural policy. It is therefore first an instrument
of perestroik4 but it is in itself a major political
tool because it allows Mr. Gorbachev to rec-
oncile his regime with intellectual circles which
had been the main victims of repression under
his predecessors and to make a sweeping appeal
to public opinion to mobilise it against all those
who are still attached to former practices either
because they assimilate them with the com-
munist r6gime, or because they derive, or believe
they derive, personal advantage from them or
because they wish to protect themselves against
the political risk of the opponents of perestroika
returning to power.
18. In fact, perestroika seems to be encoun-
tering a multitude of difficulties and delays, the
principal one being the abandonment in January
1989, in principle provisionally, of the freeing of
prices, an essential part ofany progress towards
rational economic management. This is very
probably due to the realisation that there was a
shortage of goods that would have quickly led to
inflation if the law of supply and demand had
replaced state law. It is taking a long time for the
expected results of perestroika to be felt. The new
Soviet leaders obviously hoped that there would
be a speedy improvement in the population's
standard of living in order to stimulate enthu-
siasm for reform. In fact, decisions on reforms
had to be delayed to allow the government to
oyercome opposition. Their application is
inciting further opposition with resulting
obstacles and delays. Results might take a long
time to emerge and Soviet economists are now
announcing that it will take several decades to
improve signifigaally the living conditions of the
people.
19. Conversely, glasnost, after a few incidents
which made the authorities force the media to
play their r6le, seems to have been imposed
irrevocably because it brought immediate advan-
tages for the people which are truly appreciated.
Access to new topics of information and public
discussion has become a reality. The veils have
been lifted from natural disasters and human
failings and many afflictions. Alcoholism, drugs,
prostitution and comrption are the principal
deviations that the state intends to fight.
However, mistakes or excesses by the adminis-
tration or anny are reported in the press and on
television. For instance, there has been strong
criticism of those responsible for the unneces-
sarily brutal repression of the peaceful demon-
strations in Tbilisi in April 1989 and the gov-
ernment has undertaken to take appropriate
corrective action. Western Russian-language
radio broadcasts are no longer jammed and pre-
viously banned works are being published, often
in magazines that ensure a wide distribution.
The whole cultural spectrum has been opened:
there are exhibitions of works of painters such as
Chagall, the songs and poetry of Vladimir
Vyssotski can be heard and discussed, television
programmes are better presented, new pro-
grammes are created, the works of Pasternak are
published, the orthodox church has access to tel-
evision and its leaders are consulted about the
problems of society.
20. This opening, which acknowledges that
intellectuals and artists have a vital r6le to play
in arousing social awareness, breaks with a
practice that had prevailed since Stalin, i.e. that
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anything outside the control of the parfy and the
authorities should not be mentioned in the press
which was mainly intended to educate the
masses. Glasnost also has to facilitate restruc-
turing as a whole by fostering research and the
emergence of solutions to the many problems.
21. Nevertheless, censorship has not been
completely abolished. On lst July 1988, it was
confirmed at the nineteenth parfy conference
that openness must not jeopardise the interests
of the state, society and individual rights. In mil-
itary matters, the notion of secrecy is still very
extensive and the exact content of the defence
budget remains difficult to grasp. The same is
true of foreign policy of which there is little
critical analysis; the writings of some authors are
still not to be found in bookshops. Furthermore,
glasnost is not accompanied by any institutional
changes: there has been no change in procedure
for appointing chief editors of newspapers; pro-
cedure for publishing and cultural matters is still
under close party control.
22. One of the most significant aspects of this
cultural openness, however, is the condemnation
of Stalinist excesses. On 2nd November 1987,
Mr. Gorbachev announced the formation of a
commission of inquiry into Stalin's victims.
Some of Lenin's companions have been rehabili-
tated and in June it was decided to erect a mon-
ument to the memory of Stalin's victims. Yet
Trotsky has still not been rehabilitated. One way
" or another, official history is still being corrected
but the door does not yet seem fully open for a
free and critical historical work about the Soviet
Union.
23. This reanimation of intellectual and cul-
tural life is accompanied by a more conciliatory
attitude towards dissidence. A number of dissi-
dents have been freed and the existence ofpris-
oners for their opinions has been recognised. The
will to terminate such severe measures has been
expressed. Emigration is no longer a crime: 8 000
Jews were authorised to leave the Soviet Union
in 1987 and 7 600 in the first months of 1988,
and, according to Israeli sources, the Soviet
Union is believed to have undertaken to author-
ise hundreds of thousands of Jews to emigrate.in
the near future. Authorisation to emigrate has
also been granted or promised to Germans and
Armenians.
24. Certain spectacular actions, such as the
press conference by Andrei Sakharov at the Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs on 3rd June 1988 to
emphasise progress achieved and yet to be
accomplished in the free movement of persons,
were intended to improve the Soviet lJnion's
image in the world and have indeed effectively
done so. Sakharov's election to the Supreme
Soviet by Soviet Academicians confirmed this
impression. It is clear that one of Mr. Gor-
bachev's main aims is to offer his country new
drive in its external policy. The Soviet Union is
trylng to strengthen and sometimes recover its
positions, influence and contacts. In certain
cases, it has not hesitated to take the first step, as
in the case of Japan after ten years of an almost
total break in relations. Mr. Gorbachev's visits to
Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic
Republic seem to have been intended to show
that the Soviet Union no longer made its rela-
tions with those countries dependent on their
internal policy. The major short-term priority,
however, seems to be East-West relations.
25. In less than four years, this new policy has
caused far-reaching changes in international rela-
tions and the Soviet Union's relations with the
rest of the world. It will therefore be central to
your Rapporteur's analysis and he will study
changes in Soviet defence policy before tackling
the more general aspects of the new policy and
then drawing conclusions on what Europe can do
to adapt itself to the new situation.
III. Soviet defence policy
26. Until recently, the military aspect of the
Soviet threat attained disturbing proportions. [t
involved the deployment of large numbers of
troops and tens of thousands of tanks, a fast-
expanding fleet, unequalled machinery for intel-
ligence and subversion, strategic parity with the
United States, increasingly marked superiority at
each level oftheatre nuclear weapons and stocks
of chemical weapons that had no equivalent. It
now seems that, if the perception of the threat is
losing its edge among western public opinion,
this is primarily due to the publicity campaign
that Mr. Gorbachev has been wagrng since he
came to power rather than to actual deployment.
His innumerable proposals relating to every
aspect of disarmament and the limitation of
armaments, the unilateral force and arrns
reduction measures that he has taken or
encouraged his allies to take, the evacuation of
Afghanistan, disengagement from most of the
conllicts in which the Soviet Union had played a
major r6le and concessions made to ensure that
the Vienna conference on security and co-
operation in Europe succeeded and the various
arms limitation negotiations progressed are all
signs of a deep-rooted evolution in Soviet
defence policy.
27 - The aims of this policy had not changed
fundamentally since the l9l7 revolution and
were determined by the doctrine underlying all
Soviet policy. To sum it up briefly, its main
element, in the Stalinist era al least, was that,
since a communist state had existed, the class
struggle had become the leitmotif of interna-
tional relations which were therefore inevitably
dominated by the clash between capitalism and
communism. The aim being to lead the entire
world towards communism, it was first a
question of safeguarding the communist sanc-
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tuary, which the capitalist states could but wish
to destroy, in order to establish the only true
peace, that which would be inaugurated with the
victory of the proletariat. Thus the will for peace
merged with the will for revolution and its
achievement would come only after victory. But
it could also be a propaganda weapon since it
could be opposed to the antagonism aroused by
capitalist competition. The notion of peaceful
coexistence during the Khrushchev era took
nuclear deterrence into account by indicating
that, if true peace was not possible, the struggle
between the two sides could take on forms other
than armed confrontation. Nevertheless, the
Soviet Union had to remain strongly armed in
order to be able to resist victoriously any
offensive by its natural enemies. It also con-
tinued to use conflicts between capitalist coun-
tries or colonial wars to weaken the enemy camp.
28. This concept of inter-state relations
resulted in the perpetuation of the Soviet
Union's obsession of being surrounded that
events between 1917 and 1941 and also the pro-
liferation of American bases in the seas sur-
rounding the Soviet Union could but strengthen,
leading the instigators of Soviet military thinking
to consider using their forces in the context ofan
offensive strategy. The arms policy pursued by
the Soviet Union since 1945 aimed at giving it
the means for such a strategy: absolute superi-
ority in tanks, artillery and short-range missiles
and the search for naval parity, with little
account being taken of the West's deterrent capa-
bility. The main aim of Soviet strategy did not
seem to be to avoid war but to place the Soviet
Union in the best possible position for making
Soviet interests prevail when what many con-
sidered to be an inevitable conflict broke out.
29. However, in May 1987, the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact allies announced that they
had changed their military doctrine. Henceforth,
Soviet strategy would be a defensive one aimed
6ainly at the prevention of war. According to
certain Soviet analysts, this doctrine, based on
* the new thinking ", involved the rejection of
war and recourse to force as the instrument of a
policy.
30. Two fundamental concepts underly the
Soviet Union's new strategic thinking:
- 
the concept of " reasonable suffi-
ciency', copied from the West,
according to which each country should
have armed forces strong enough to
repel an attack but not strong enot'gh to
conduct oflensive operations;
- 
the concept of " mutual security "
according to which the Soviet Union is
secure only if the United States is too.
This concept of course leads to an obli-
gation to make joint efforts to ensure
the success of arms limitation negotia-
tions.
However, the concept of sufficiency is provoking
much discussion in the Soviet Union.
31. Three schools of thought have emerged:
(a) That of many in military circles who con-
sider that'o sufficiency o' is always needed. In this
connection, they prefer to use the words o'suffi-
cient defence " which should ensure the security
of the Soviet Union and at the same time not
frighten other countries. According to General
Tretyak, Commander of Soviet air defence
forces, 'the principle of defence sufficiency is
unshakable. It is necessary to have as many
forces as are needed to ensure the security ofthe
Soviet Union and our allies ". According to Mr.
Yazov, the new Minister of Defence, " the limits
of defence sufficiency are determined by the
actions of the United States and NATO'0, which
seems to imply that the Soviet commander
would like the government to adopt a more
dynamic attitude allowing advantage to be syste-
matically taken of all technological and scientific
knowledge derived from research for the pur-
poses of defence against the West. In fact, such a
doctrine could justifu continued Soviet
deployment at the cost of a few semantic sacri-
fices.
(b) That of the reformists who believe it pos-
sible to structure forces so that they are deployed
in a defensive posture in accordance with the
models of " sufficiency ". They follow the
Gorbachev military policy according to which
strategy must be based on " reasonable suffi-
ciency " and adopt a defensive orientation. Gen-
erally speaking, this school of thought includes
members of peace committees such as the Com-
mittee of Soviet Scientists for Peace.
@ That of the unilateraftits for whom the
Soviet Union should take unilateral steps to
apply * reasonable sufficiency'. According to
this school of thought, the Soviet Union should
give up the arms race and maintain a small
number of forces so as to concentrate its efforts
on strengthening the economy. The ensuing
improvement in the Soviet economy would not
only rectiff the internal situation but should also
increase Soviet power and prestige. However,
this way of thinking is weakened by the Soviet
refusal of the notion of 'deterrence', which it
assimilates to the threat of nuclear weapons,
whereas the very reason for maintaining a small
number of forces would be deterrence.
32. At present, it is the Gorbachev version of
the defensive doctrine which seems in the lead
subject to the promise to maintain forces at a
level that precludes United States strategic super-
iority. This doctrine was expressed particularly
clearly by General Mikhail Moiseyev, appointed
Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces and
First Deputy Minster of Defence of the Soviet
Union in December 1988, in an interview
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$anted to the Tass Agency on 8th February
1989. According to Tass:
* In the coming years, the Soviet Union is
to reduce its military budget by 14.20/o, a
quite justifiable step at political and stra-
tegic level... Until recently, the Soviet
Union has followed the following prin-
ciple: savings can be made everywhere
except in defence. But today tne mititary
build-up tasks that have to be carried out
must be viewed in closer relation with
national problems as a whole on the basis
of detailed, varied economic calculations.
In short, we must now know how to make
economies in defence.
At the present time, political approaches
are becoming decisive in warding off war
but they must be accompanied by mea-
sures to strengthen defence since only this
mix will allow a policy of peace to be con-
ducted and any attempt to use the lan-
guage of force with us to be cut short. So
we are reducing our armed forces to adapt
them to the new tasks and make them
clearly defensive, without detriment to
their ability to fight, without any delay in
order to preclude a possible break in the
present balance of armed forces... The
announced reduction of 500 000 men in
the army and navy will start this year and
will affect all components of the Soviet
armed forces. "
General Moiseyev was expressing the doctrine
worked out by the new Soviet leaders whose
effects had already been felt for more than a year
in Soviet political behaviour and statements but
which had been slow to take effect in military
terms.
33. Early in 1988, Mr. Carlucci, then United
States Secretary of Defence, met Mr. Yazov,
Soviet Minister of Defence, in Bern to'examine
with him the impact of Gorbachev's new think-
ing on international security. Mr. Carlucci con-
sidered there had not yet been any real change in
the structure of Soviet forces. He nevertheless
proposed following closely the actual implemen-
tation of this new strategy, while recalling
NATO's policy of deterrence. In spite of their
opposition, the two countries announced their
desire to increase contacts between members of
the two armies. Mr. Carlucci was therefore
invited, during summer 1988, to visit Soviet mil-
itary installations. After his many meetings with
Soviet military leaders, he said he was disap-
pointed by the new Soviet defence policy which,
he believed, continued to seek military superi-
ority and to maintain offensive options against
NATO forces.
34. During these visits, Mr. Carlucci voiced
the United States yiews on the trend in Soviet
" new military thinking ", in particular when
addressing the Military Academy in Moscow on
lst August 1988:
- 
* The way to advance the Soviet-
American dialogue is not to paper over
our differences, but to face them
squarely, search for common ground
and build on it.
- 
We must continue to work together to
find ways to prevent dangerous military
incidents that might spark a confron-
tation neither of us wants.
- 
We recognise that the Soviet Union has
legitimate defence needs and we are
aware of the suffering your country has
endured in the past.
- 
No one begrudges you the need for a
strong and capable army. "
Answering Soviet reproaches, he said, in regard
to United states deterrent strategy:
- 
" From our point of view, and I say this
with sincerity, there is no threat to the
Soviet Union.
- 
Our doctrine is one of deterrence, to dis-
suade the other side from attacking. It is
not a doctrine that threatens the Soviet
Union or any other country. "
In conclusion, Mr. Carlucci left open all possibil-
ities of understanding, sayrng he was aware that
the changes that had been started might take
time to implement. He added:
* We, in the United States, will continue
to wait and watch 
- 
and will welcome con-
structive change when we see it manifested
in concrete terms.'
35. The prolongation of " new thinking " in
military matters and loyalty to glasnost led the
Soviets, in October 1988, to convene military
observers from seventeen countries, including
the NATO countries, to observe manoeuwes by
Soviet and German Warsaw Pact army units in
East Germany in accordance with the con-
vention signed in Stockhom in l986laying down
conditions in which the signatory countries
should be authorised to observe the others'
manoeuwes in Europe. Observers from the
Soviet Union and the GDR had already attended
NATO autumn manoeuvres in the Federal
Republic in September 1988. At the same time,Mr. Kuznetsov, Deputy Director of the
American Bureau of the Soviet Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, announced that a detailed
defence budget would be published at the
beginning of 1990. Your Rapporteur received
confirmation that the Soviet Union was pre-
paring a new presentation of its mititary budget
to allow a valid comparison with that of the
United States.
DOCUMENT I187
36. In May 1988, a symposium under the joint
sponsorship of the NATO Defence College and
the Washinglon National Defence University
was held in Rome on " East-West relations three
years after Gorbachev's accession to power:
implications for NATO ". Most participants,
while expressing optimism about d6tente, never-
theless expressed some reserves about these pros-
pects of success and their implications for the
alliance. General Altenburg, Chairman of the
NATO Military Committee, pointed out in his
introductory speech that it was clear that the
Soviet leader had made a considerable impact on
public opinion in all the NATO nations and
itressed the permanency of the threat. Other par-
ticipants expressed very similar views, under-
lining that arms had in no way been reduced
since Mr. Gorbachev came to power. Only Mr.
Egon Bahr had a more favourable view of Mr.
Gbrbachev's intentions, saying he was convinced
that balance, even conventional, at a lower level
had become one of his political aims. Mr. Bahr's
views seem to have been confirmed by Soviet
proposals and measures decided upon at the end
of 1988 and the beginning of 1989.
37. Western reactions are therefore of two
kinds. Some consider new military thinking to be
the Soviet Union's realisation of the danger of a
military confrontation which mlght involve the
use of nuclear weapons whereas others believe it
to be a temporary stage intended to facilitate
perestroika by reactivating economic, political
and military relations with the West and not pre-
cluding the resumption of an offensive policy
when ihe internal situation allows. However, it
seems impossible not to note certain changes in
military matters. First, Mr. Gorbachev has con-
ducted a major purge at the top of the military
hierarchy, which seems to have allowed him to
remove the generals who were most opposed to a
true disarmament policy. Thus, following the
affair of the Cessna aircraft that landed in Red
Square on 28th May 1987, he dismissed his Min-
ister of Defence, Mr. Sokolov, who was 76, and
replaced him by a younger man, General Yazov.
He also removed ten of the sixteen Deputy Min-
isters of Defence, three of the five heads of
department and eight of the sixteen commanders
of military divisions. Other military leaders have
since been removed and again in January 1989
with the resignations that followed publication of
the document on NATO and Warsaw Pact
forces.
38. Second, since 1988 a school ofthought has
emerged to the effect that the Soviet army should
be a volunteer force so that some of the present
troops may be returned to the civilian sector: a
small army of volunteers and professionals at a
high technological level would be more appro-
priate for the new defence policy, which would
mean reducing the length of compulsory military
service. Some American and British experts are,
however, sceptical about the actual implemen-
tation of such a reform, particularly as every-
thing indicates that Mr. Gorbachevos relations
with the army have been difficult. He takes deci-
sions that he imposes on the military and some
of them seem to disapprove of this encroach-
ment on their powers, which hitherto had rarely
been challenged. Even General Moiseyev,
appointed Chief of General Staff by Mr.
Gorbachev in December 1988, strongly opposed
the abolition of compulsory military service in
February 1989. However, in March the Soviet
authorities, through the intermediary of the
Vice-Chairman of the State Education Com-
mittee, announced a relaxation of military
service for students who will henceforth be able
to complete their studies without having to serve
their two years' military service. Military prepa-
ration for girls has also been abolished.
39. But 1987 will remain above all the year in
which the agreement on intermediate-range
nuclear forces was concluded. This agreement
allowed Mr. Gorbachev to grve a new turn to his
country's foreign policy. The treaty on disman-
tling intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and
shorter-range nuclear forces (SRfNrF) was signed
in Washington on 8th December 1987 during
Mr. Gorbaihev's visit. Concluded after six years
of negotiations, it put an end to a dispute that
had lasted more than ten years starting with the
deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe aI
a time when, in spite of the signing of the SALT I
treaty in 1972, the Soviet Union was continuing
to stiengthen its nuclear potential, causing very
sharp East-West tension.
40. Since the SS-20s significantly increased the
imbalance of nuclear forces in Europe, NATO
reacted to the threat in December 1979, it
decided to deploy 572 new American missiles if
the negotiations it had proposed holding with the
Soviei Union were unsuccessful. The negotia-
tions, which were started in November 1981,
soon failed since the Soviet Union refused to
compromise and threatened the West with mil-
itary- counter-measures if the American missiles
were deployed. The negotiations were suspended
bv the Kremlin in November 1983 after NATO
hid started to implement its programme. A
section of western public opinion reacted very
strongly against the application of NATO's
twofold decision and the Soviet Union did all it
could to encourage this reaction.
41. The treaty signed on 8th December 1987 is
therefore important from two points of view: for
the frrst time, it imposed no ceilings or reduc-
tions but eliminated two categories of nuclear
weapons, ground-based intermediate-range mis-
sites (t 000 to 5 000 km) and shorter-range mis-
siles (500 to I 000 km). The second innovation
was the methods of verification: again for the
first time, provision was made for on-site inspec-
tions, together with observation satellites. First
inspections on the territories of the United
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States, the Soviet Union and European states in
which INF are deployed (the GDR, Czechoslo-
vakia, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, the
Federal Republic and the United Kingdom)
should allow them to be dismantled and elimi-
nated within three years. They are to be com-
pleted by other measures over a period of
thirteen years in accordance with a detailed time-
table and conditions.
42. In order to reach this agreement, Mr.
Gorbachev several times had to break with his
predecessors and their uncompromising atti-
tudes, in particular by renouncing, in accordance
with his unswerving doctrine, the Soviet Union's
radical opposition to on-site inspections. The
Soviet Union has since started to train a team of
inspectors and says it is prepared to accept the
principle of on-site inspection for all disarm-
ament agreements. The INF agreement was fol-
lowed by the llth January 1989 declaration
closing the Paris conference sa lnnniag chemical
weapons in which 149 states, including the
Soviet lJnion, renounced the use of these
weapons and undertook to seek an agreement
banning their production and stockpiling. The
Soviet Union, the main holder of chemical
weapons, only recently admitted that this was so
but, out of respect for its new image, proposed
destroying its stocks forthwith. In view of the dif-
ficulty of destroying such weapons and the size
of Soviet stocks, one may nevertheless wonder
whether it will manage to do so within the
ten-year period it had requested at the Geneva
negotiations.
43. In wondering why Mr. Gorbachev made
these concessions, it should be recalled that,
while Mr. Brezhnev's policy made the Soviet
Union a $eat military power, it did not prevent
the United States from deploying new missiles in
Europe. Above all, it fostered the revival of mil-
itary programmes that had been suspended or
abandoned and, in 1983, the start of the SDI(strategic defence initiative) programme which
reactivated the arms race at too fast a pace for
the Soviet Union. By agreeing to sign these
agreements, Mr. Gorbachev recoenised the
failure of Mr. Brezhnev's action and ended the
stalemate: American missiles were withdrawn
from Europe, relations with the United States
were renewed, Soviet diplomacy gained new
impetus and western defence policies mrght
again be contested by the section of public
opinion that had opposed the 1979 twofold
decision. The INF treaty certainly reduces the
two great powers' nuclear arsenals by only 4o/o,
which does not undermine their power, but it is a
new starting point for the disarmament
process.
44. In his speeches since 1986, Mr. Gorbachev
has advocated a denuclearised world, stressing
the dangers ofnuclear weapons and the interde-
pendence of states. He asserts that * security can
no longer be ensured by military means " and
denounces nuclear weapons, * the absolute and
most fearful evil ", and deterrence, " which is an
obsolete idea " (Pravda, lTth September 1987),
which corresponds fairly closely to President
Reagan's words when launching SDI on 23rd
March 1983, expressing his will to free the world
of the threat of nuclear war and calling deter-
rence in.question.
45. In 1988, the two great powers agreed on
the principle of a 500/o reduction in their strategic
weapons (START negotiations). Differences
remain, however, since the two countries do not
have the same force structure, making it difficult
to achieve accurate definitions of limitations. It
was not possible to siggr an agreement on this
subject at the Soviet-American summit meeting
in June 1988, but information received at the
end of the year gave the impression that most ofthe obstacles have now been overcome,
including the link established by the Soviet
Union between the START agreement and the
pursuit of the SDI programme and the problem
of the interpretation of the ABM treaty. The
Soviet Union now seems less preoccupied with
this matter. Perhaps it has confidence in the
success of the movement it has started since
prospects of disarmament are prompting Con-
gress to cut back on credits for the SDI pro-
gramme and public opinion to prefer a reduction
in intercontinental weapons to the pursuit of
SDI.
46. The Warsaw Pact has superiority in con-
ventional weapons. It admitted this when pub-
lishing, in January 1989, its own version of the
comparison of forces of the two alliances. The
problem is that this superiority is a threat to
Europe that would increase if nuclear disarm-
ament negotiations were to lead to agreements
before a balance of conventional weapons is
achieved. It was normal for the Soviet Union to
stress nuclear disarmament. It was no less
normal for NATO to require parallel progress in
the two sets of negotiations. Mr. Gorbachev
accepted this point of view in June 1988 as was
confirmed by the Warsaw Pact on 16th July.
47. Without waiting for negotiations to be
started, the Warsaw Pact decided on 8th
December 1988 to withdraw six armoured divi-
sions from Eastern Europe, a decision
announced by Mr. Gorbachev in the United
Nations at the same time as the decision to
reduce Soviet armed forces by 500 000 men. On
22td, December 1988, Major General Yuri
Lebedev, Deputy Army Chief of Staff, gave
details of the implementation of this reduction
which concerned, among others, forces stationed
in the Eastern European countries.
48. In 1988, pfu. tr'italii Shlykov, an economist
and commentator on military matters close to
the government, published a significant article
underlining that the maintenance of a large
10
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number of armoured vehicles in Europe had
been a mistake on the part of the former military
leaders. Acknowledging Soviet superiority in
tanks, he believed this arm, which was both
offensive and fragile, hardly met the require-
ments of Soviet security and that the West had
taken advantage of this asymmetry to develop
technologicallyand economically far more useful
strategic initiatives, including nuclear, to ensure
its military power. In order to reduce this dis-
parity, Mr. Shlykov raised the idea that a zero
bption for armoured vehicles would be possible
and that zones forbidden to armoured vehicles
might thus be formed in Europe parallel vrith the
denuclearised zones. However, this idea is appar-
ently encountering serious objections among t\e
mili-tary, who are still profoundly loyal to their
" armoured vehicle mentality ". Nevertheless, it
perhaps explains the announcement in Decem-
ber t98g of tne destruction of 5 000 Soviet
armoured vehicles.
49. Following the Soviet Union, the GDR,
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria announced reduc-
tions in their armed forces. Mr. Honecker, Head
of the East German State and Unified Socialist
Party, announced on 23rd January that the East
German army would be reduced by 100 000
men, 600 tanks and 50 combat aircraft and
expenditure on defence cut by 100/o before the
end of 1990. He said this decision was aimed at
making the army even more defensive. He also
announced the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
German territory and gave details of its imple-
mentation. Czechoslovakia did likewise, the
reduction involving 150/o of military expenditure,
12 000 men, 850 tanks, 51 combat aircraft and
165 armoured vehicles. Bulgaria for its part
decided to cut its budget by l2o/o in 1989 and to
reduce its armed forces by l0 000 men, 200
tanks, 20 atrcraft.and 200 artillery systems before
the end of 1990. Poland and Hungary, too, had
previously announced similar reductions.
50. On 30th January 1989, for the first time
Moscow published a detailed account of forces -
men and equipment - stationed in Europe by
both sides. This publication is a move towards
generalised, tangibly implemented openness, in
particular in defence matters where secrecy was a
well-established principle. Furthermore, the
Warsaw Pact officially admitted its military
superiority in three areas: battle tanks, troop car-
riers and artillery, not counting very short-range
missiles. This was a break with previous Warsaw
Pact attitudes since, as recently as March 1988, it
had, following the NATO summit meeting in
Brussels, denounced " the premeditated lies
about the assumed superiority of the Soviet
Union which could bring troops to the battlefield
in Europe more quickly than the United States ".
NATO should now be gratified since the East is
going back on its assertions and openly-
iecognising that there were grounds for most of
NATO's assertions, which it had denied for
many years. Nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact con-
tinues to assert that there is approximate parity
between the two sides and that the unilateral
reductions announced by some of its countries
should be followed by corresponding western
unilateral reductions in areas where the West is
superior.
51. If these data are compared with those
issued by NATO in November 1988, two
remarks may be made: on the one hand, there
are still differences of assessment in several
areas. Generally speaking, each alliance tends to
overestimate the other's military potential. On
the other hand, the Warsaw Pact has included in
its tables figures for navdl forces, stressing the
superiority of NATO which it says has 499 war-
ships compared with 102 for the Warsaw Pact
and nuclear missiles not included in the agenda
of the conventional disarmament conference that
is to open in Vienna on 6th March 1989.
52. The West considers that the Vienna con-
ference should reveal the disparities between the
two blocs and remove them. The Soviet Union
accepts this principle but wants to move imme-
diately from pariry to reduction. But the West is
afraid the Soviets may try to re-establish a link
between conventional and tactical nuclear
weapons. Through the intermediary of the
NAiO spokesman, it therefore rejects the notion
of parity, instead calling for equal security. Con-
trolling North Atlantic waters is indeed essential
for western security, which depends on the
arrival of American reinforcements and
equipment in Europe whereas those of the Soviet
Union do not depend on sea transport, and the
United States is vigorously refusing to negotiate
any kind of naval parity. Conversely, the Soviet
Union, without calling clearly for such parity, is
stressing the threat to its territory represented by
the many United States aircraft-carriers and the
multipliiation of United States naval aviation
bases round the Soviet Union. Aware of these
differences, the Warsaw Pact specified in its
communiqu6 that these figures are not used fully
as starting parameters in the negotiations, which
shows tfiat it is tackling the negotiations
flexibly.
53. The West has been somewhat embarrassed
by these Soviet overtures. First, they were made
ai a time when the United States, in the throes of
an election and then of appointing its new
administration, in which the Secretary of
Defence, Mr. John Tower, was immediately chal-
lenged and then replaced by Mr. Cheney, is not
in a position to work out, and still less adopt, a
new 
-security policy. Soviet declarations have
merely provided arguments for the opposition
and niade it more difficult to work out a disarm-
ament policy in the United States. They have
also eniouraged, among public opinion in both
Europe and the United States, not only those in
ll
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favour of immediate, unilateral nuclear disarm-
ament but also all those who want state expend-
iture to be cut or switched to sectors othei than
defence. For instance, recent opinion polls in the
Federal Republic have shown that a large section
of German public opinion considered that the
Soviet Union was no longer a threat. Gener-
alisation of such reactions would obviously be a
blow to the policy of deterrence pursued by the
Atlantic Alliance just when deterrence seems to
be attaining what has always been its aim: to put
an end to the threat in order to achieve sub-
stantial disarmament and allow the restoration
of normal East-West relations. Governments
may therefore fear pressure from public opinion
leading to an unduly sharp reduction in the
western defence effort, whereas the measures
actually taken by the Soviet Union and its allies
are still very limited.
54. This is probably why they are expressing
such scepticism about Soviet statements. At theii
meeting in Brussels in March 1988, the allies
confirmed their attachment to their aims in con-
ventional arms limitation negotiations:
- 
to bring about a stable, secure balance of
conventional forces at reduced levels;
- 
to eliminate disparities detrimental to
stability and security;
- 
to eliminate the possibility of launching
a surprise attack or starting a large-scale
operation.
The only measure the Atlantic Alliance has been
able to take in response to Soviet gestlrres was to
decide to reduce the scale of its 1989 autumn
manoeuwes in the Federal Republic. On the one
hand, the actual manoeuwes will be reduced
and, on the other, fewer troops will be brorrght to
Europe from the United States. Finally, NntO
has announced that it is prepared to eliminate a
large part of its nuclear arsenal deployed in
Europe provided it can modernise its Lance
short-range missiles. To this end, on 22ndMarch
the experts of NATO's highJevel goup adopted
a report on restructuring and modernising short-
range nuclear weapons. This report confirms that
NATO must restructure the short-range nuclear
weapons remaining after the reductions and
modernise its SNF missiles. But no compromise
has yet been found, since there are stifl differ-
ences betwesl alliss, suggesting that no definite
decision will be taken before the forthcoming
Atlantic summit meeting on29th and 30th May-.Mr. Gorbachev, for his part, confirmed inLondon in April that he was against
modernisation. Increasing the range of Lance
missiles seems to be the main probltm since an
increase to 480 km would bring it close to the
lower limit of 500 km provided for in the INF
agreements and the Soviet Union claims that, to
have these agreements signed, it had to renounce
SS-23s with a range of 460 km.
55. Furthermore, in his speech in London on
7th April, Mr. Gorbachev voiced his opposition
to NATO maintaining its doctrine of nuclear
deterrence, thus contesting the aim intended by
the West:
" As for the doctrine of nuclear deterrence,
I believe that it is high time that, instead of
speaking of how to 'deter' others with
nuclear weapons, we spoke of how to
deter, to keep in check nuclear weapons
themselves. "
However, in his talks in the Soviet Union, your
Rapporteur was given the impression that it was
not believed realistic to consider that strategic
n_uclear weapons could be dismantled quickly.
Great importance was attached to the forth-
coming opening of negotiations on all very short-
range nuclear weapons: missiles, where the
Soviet Union has very great superiority, but also
artillery and airborne weapons.
56. Western Europe for its part is ill-prepared
to assess the decision on the unilateral reduction
of forces announced by Mr. Gorbachev at the
United Nations in December 1988. For the time
being, it is the United States which, thanks to its
satellites, is supplying useful information to its
ellies in regard to identification and verification
by satellite. In December 1988, the Assembly
adopted two recommendations on verification,
one of which proposed the creation of a
European satellite agency to allow Europe to play
an active r6le in the negotiations.
57. At the Vienna Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe, the participating coun-
tries agreed on the text of a final document on
l3th January 1989, subject to an agreement still
to be concluded on the mandate of the negotia-
tions on conventional armed forces in Europe.
Mr. Gorbachev had already advocated a pan-
European summit meeting to discuss this matter,
which may have implied that the United States
and Canada would be excluded, and proposed
reducing the number of Soviet aircraft based in
Eastern Europe if NATO abandoned the rede-
ployment in Italy of the 72 Ameican F-16 air-
craft just withdrawn from Spain.
58. However, these initiatives raise several
qroblem-s: first, the Soviet Union asked, althoueh
the Soviets had superiority, that disparities 6e
rectified by mutual concessions, which is tanta-
mount to asking for a reduction in the American
presence in Europe. By asking to include in the
negotiations nuclear weapons with a range of less
than 500 km, it exploited the differences of views
on this matter among the western countries: the
Federal Republic was asking for these missiles to
be reduce( which the Americans, French and
British considqed premature. After accepting the
separation of the two series of negotiatibns,
the Soviet Union raised the question of theo'modernisation 
" of lance missiles which is
t2
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dividing the members of the Atlantic Alliance.
Some members, such as the Federal Republic
and Belgium, are asking that this be delayed for
several years at least so as not to hold up the
progress of disarmament negotiations, whereas
itre United States wishes this to be done quickly
so that NATO will not remain too far behind in
very short-range missiles.
59. Examination of Soviet defence policy, as
far as can be judged now, therefore means
drawing reserved conclusions. It would be
absurd to consider Soviet statements merely as
the instrument of a tactic designed to divide and
weaken the West. Yet it must be noted that they
do effectively weaken and divide and this is par-
ticularly serious because the West organised its
security only in order to meet the Soviet threat.
It is also quite clear that the move from words to
deeds is slow: withdrawing Soviet divisions from
Eastern Europe, reducing troop levels in the
Soviet Union and its allied countries, destroying
large quantities of military equipment_and intrG'
duiing true openness in the defence effort cannot
be done overnight. Conversely, the re-exami-
nation ofthe defence and strategic policy ofthe
past forty years, the appointmenl to the most
ienior commands of military staff who support
Mr. Gorbachev's policy, the publication of a
table of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces which,
while not uncontested, nevertheless opens the
door to realistic negotiations and recoenition of
the West's security requirements show a concern
to achieve effective disarmament which appears
particularly real as it corresponds to the eco-
nomic and internal policy requirements of the
Soviet authorities.
60. Whether or not its leaders so wish, the
West will have to give a positive answer to
Soviet proposals and deeds. However, it will
have to do io without compromising its security
and without abandoning, in d6tente, what it
managed to defend during the cold war.
Il/. The Soviet Union and EuroPe
61. Although the major part of Soviet terrilory
is in Asia, the Soviet Union remains primarily a
European power. Only in Europe can it find the
partners it needs for its economic developmeltind only in Europe can its security be
threatened, at least in the foreseeable future. In
this respect, Mr. Gorbachev's call for a
" common European house " fits the facts.
However, in this zlrea as in many others, Soviet
policy is hindered considerably by the weight of
its plst and above all that of the Stalin era.
Admittedly, its 1945 annexations at the expense
of Finland, the Baltic states, Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Romania give rise to no real
difficulties for its external policy and provoke
only minor problems in its internal affiairs. But
the establishment by use of force of r6gimes too
favourable to it in countries which find it hard to
support them has created a delicate situation.
The difficulties encountered by Mr. Khrushchev
in several countries had already contributed to
his downfall and the abandonment of his liber-
alisation policy in the Soviet Union itself. Soviet
public opinion seems to find it very hard to
accept anything that might appear to reduce
Soviet influence in Europe, be it ideological, eco-
nomic or military.
62. There was an obvious contradiction in Mr.
Brezhnev's poticy which at one and the same
time promoted the CSCE and instigated the mil-
itary - occupation of Czechoslovakia when it
started to apply the principles to which the
Soviet Union was to subscribe in Helsinki. It is
difficult to assess how far Mr. Gorbachev has
overcome this contradiction and to know how
much independent action the Soviet Union is
now granting the people's democracies. Never-
thelesi, it is on this among other things that the
contents of the common European house, which
has become one of his slogans, will depend, i.e-
relations between the Soviet Union and both
Western and Eastern EuroPe.
(a) The Sovict Unian and its European allics
63. When Mr. Gorbachev came to power, the
Eastern European countries were not at all a
homogeneous entity. Their relations with the
SovieiUnion were not of the same type and their
internal situations were very different. Procla-
mation of perestroika took them by surprise in
very different positions and this strongly influ-
enced their reactions. It is therefore worth
making a brief reference to the case of each of
these countries.
64. (i) Hunsary had already had a period of
reform in the previous decade and, when Mr.
Gorbachev came to power, it was running out of
breath in its economic liberalisation which could
not go much further without a relaxation of the
politlcal bonds which it could not shake off. Mr.
Janos Kadar, party General Secretary since 1956,
had undertaken a policy of restructuring:
important responsibilities entrusted to young
people, an atmosphere favourable to certain
Ibrms of political pluralism and, above all, devel-
opment of a large-scale free market supplied by
agricultural co-operatives which had extended
t[eir activities in many areas. His age and
bureaucratic attitude explain his retirement on
23rd June 1987 and his replacement by Mr.
Karoly Grosz, a party man accepted by the
reformists, who is said to be on excellent terms
with Mr. Gorbachev. He therefore surrounded
himself with reformers. On 3rd December 1987,
he confirmed the governmentos determination to
pursue the far-reaching reforms undertaken
a without concessions ". On 16th December, it
was announced at the opening of the winter
13
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session of the National Assembly that the gov-
ernment would be restructured: greater responsi-
bilities for officials with no political past, merger
of several ministries, stabilisation plan anO
greater freedom of opinion. Finally, on l lth Feb-
ruary 1989, the Central Committee of the Hun-
garian Unified Socialist Party agreed to a reformprogramme already passed by the National
Assembly aimed at restoring a multi-party
system subject to new parties * accepting
socialism ", obviously ambiguous words. HowI
_ever, thrse principles are already being appliedby the Hungarians.
65. Of all the Eastern European countries,
Hungary is certainly the one which has the most
wide-ranging relations with non-member coun-
tries of the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, with
Austria, t9 which it is linked by a common past.
Since 1987,. however, it has also developed its
relations with the European Community and
with the Council of Europe, which would not be
opposed to Hungary joining it as an observer. Its
Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the North
Atlantic Assembly in autumn 1988 and the pres-
ident of the WEU Assembly was invited to
Budapest in January 1989. This demonstration
of interest is obviously worthy of very close
attention.
66. (iil In the case of Poland, General
Jaruzelski clearly needs Soviet support and a
licence for reforrr in order to face up-to a partic-
qlarly- dynamic opposition. It is not surprising
therefore that he heartily supports tr4r. Gor-
bachev's thinking and action. Condemnation of
Stalinism by the Soviet authorities even allowed
him to recall, in moderate terms, the injustice
caused to the Poles by the signing of tne
German-Soviet pact in August 1939 and to refer
to the dissolution of the Polish Communist party
by Stalin. In April 1987, a joint committee of his-
torians was set up to throw light on the . white
spots " which mark the history of relations
between the two countries. The- Soviet Union
now seems prepared to reopen old files of con-
tention and even to tackle that of the massacre of
Polish officers at Katyn. A start has also been
made with settling the problem of Soviet citizens
of Polish origin by opening Polish consulates at
Lvov and Vilnius.
67. Poland has also tried to restructure its
internal policy: it is the first Warsaw pact
country to have introduced electoral procedure
4lowing electors some freedom of eipression.For several years now,,this has been the case for
bodies responsible for ensuring social peace inPoland (consultative 
. 
councils, new- trades
unions, various commissions and committees
close to parliament or the Council of Ministers).
Spectacular initiatives such as the trial of the
murderers of Father Popieluszko and the general
amnesty in 1986 souElt to restore the legitimacy
of the r6gime. The referendum of 29th -Novem-
ber 1987, although intended to reinforce its legit-
imacy, was a failure since the authorities forind
themselves in the minority and had to admit it.
This experience, aimed at creating new institu-
tional sectors partly outside party control, came
to nothing but, in the long run, the referendum
turned against its promoters, who had to face the
formation of a composite opposition front
against thbm, ranging from party conservatives
to Solidarity contesters.
6Q. For Poland, it is a matter of opening up,yUril the_system, autonomous areis meeting
the desire for democratisation expressed by the
population without destabilising the framework
itself, For the government, it is rather a matter of
ssataining claims and submitting them to
control by the authorities so as to limit the risk ofpluralism that is tending to be imposed by facts.
The opposition would be tolerated only if incor-porated in controlled institutions,- as was
attempted with the Consultative Council
attached to the Presidency of the Republic. yettle political situation is evolving signi{icantly
since the party is renouncing the monopoly oi
pgwer and has started round-table negotiations
with opposition representatives on many
matters, in particular the question of trade union
pluralism. In spite of certain differences between
the negotiators, one cannot gloss over the major
step-taken by the Polish Government in officially
legalising three trade unions, including Soli-
dutity, agreeing to the principle of totally free
elections to appoint a new Senate and preiident
of the Republic and accepting the principle of
economic reforms, including the indexation of
salaries on the rise in the cost of living, up to
800/0. But the political, economic and social mea-
sures taken by the Polish Government have not
yet allowed the serious crisis facing the country
to be overcome.
69. Poland's internal situation is further com-plicated by old grudges revived by events
between 1940 and 1945. Most of the population
is suspicious of any Polish Government that
relies on the Soviet Union, but no government
can take office without Soviet agreement. The
present Soviet-Polish rapprochement is certainly
beneficial to both parties, but too perfect an asso-
ciation makes the Polish authorilies dependent
on Gorbachevism in the Soviet Union itielf and,
vice versa, the failure of Jaruzelski in th6
November 1987 referendum served as an
argument for Mr. Gorbachev's opponents. Con-
versely, the Soviet authorities your Rapporteur
met spoke with interest and good will of the
experiments that have been started in Hungary
and Poland.
70. (iii) In Bulgaria, whose government seems
to be cli.Frg to a very conservative line, it is
obviously the influence of Soviet perestroika that
led to a number of changes, probably due more
to the leaders' concern to continue to benefit
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from Soviet support than to deep-rooted reform-
ing convictions. The fact that Todor Jiukov
belongs to a generation progressively removed
from power by Mr. Gorbachev has not led to his
downfall, in spite of the exceptionally cold rela-
tions between the two leaders observed in Sofia
in October 1985. Contrary to rumours circu-
lating at the time, Mr. Jiukov has remained at
the head ofboth state and party, but at the cost
of a spectacular about-turn. In this way, he has
managed to keep overall control of the pro-
motion of a new generation of officials to key
posts in the party. In April 1986, the twelfth
party con$ess elected a Central Committee, one-
third of whose members were under 50. Parallel
institutional reforms have been decided and the
economic reform reinvigorated. Several minis-
tries and government committees have been dis-
solved and the number of mandates that a parry
leader can accumulate is limited to two or,
exceptionally, three. A series of laws has been
passed by the National Assembly to * speed up
renovation of the economy and social life ". In
fact, the political situation in Bulgaria seems
marked by uncertainty. Public opinion seems
very reserved about the reforms announced since
the authorities do not seem capable of effectively
overcoming the economic crisis. Moreover,
among certain party members there are many
signs of resistance to the democratisation of
political life.
71. (iv) In Czechoslovakia, the retirement of
Mr. Gustav Husak on lTth December 1987 and
his replacement by Mr. Milos Jakes as party
General Secretary, followed by a limited reshuf-
fling of the party and state system following the
Central Committee plenum in April 1988, did
not prove to be the decisive turning point that
might have been expected. The new party
leader's policy seems much the same as that of
his predecessor. Mr. Jakes and other leaders
reject any comparison between reforms in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Soviet perestroika.
According to statements by Mr. Jakes about an
assessment that might now be made of the
Prague spring, it would appear that he is rather
embarrassed about talking of the past and its
commemoration was again repressed in January
1989. Only limited political changes have been
accepted by the present leaders. The r6le of the
various components of the National Front must
be consolidated and participation by the citizen
must remain under the close control of the
system which holds the real power.
72. Everything indicates that, after the 1968
experience, which showed what political deflec-
tions could result from liberalisation, the most
conservative elements in power, with the support
ofthe Nomenklatura, are following Moscow with
very bad grace along the road to reform that
Czechoslovak public opinion mlght exploit
against the r6gime. In this connection, moreover,
Czechoslovakia stands out from i15 6ai11 allies.
By condemning the playwright Vaclav Havel to
nine months in prison for taking part in a dem-
onstration on the twentieth anniversary of the
death of Jan Palach, an opponent of the r6gime,it threw to the winds the provisions of the
Vienna final document and interventions by
western and some eastern countries to try to
have the playwright released.
73. (v) The German Democratic Republic, too,
is very reserved about perestroika. Mr. Honecker
had already deferred applying Soviet-type
reforms in 1986. In 1987, he reaffirmed his posi-
tions, while conceding that " the restructuring
embarked upon in the Soviet Union is followed
with much sympathy and interest in the GDR'.
He did not condemn the actual principle of
reform, but specified that it would be detri-
mental to the GDR to copy the experiments of
others. He believed he had already accomplished
the necessary structural reforms. Mr. Gorbachev,
for his part, without exercising pressure on the
East German leaders, is indirectly encouraging
supporters of reforms within the GDR. He has
had the support of East German writers who, at
their tenth congress in November, voted in
favour of the innovations he had introduced in
the Soviet Union. However this may be, the
r6gime seems too uncertain of the support of the
population, still influenced by the example of the
Federal Republic's economic progress, to be able
to relax significantly the system of constraint. At
most, it has made a few concessions towards
those wishing to emigrate.
74. (vi) The case of Romania is clearly very
special, since Mr. Ceausescu's Government did
not wait for Mr. Gorbachev's reforms before
breaking with the Soviet Union and setting up a
dictatorship which is moving in a direction dia-
metrically opposed to that which perestroika has,
to various degrees, made the other people's
democracies adopt. Public opinion and govern-
ments in most countries of the world, including
the eastern countries, are up in arms at Mr.
Ceausescu's r6gime. Romania is under interna-
tional pressure: condemned morally by several of
its allies, it has been officially blacklisted by the
West.
75. These divergent reactions to perestroika
by Eastern European countries are due to each
one's specific situation. The fact that none of
them has held free elections for more than forty
years means that no one can foresee the reactions
of public opinion and the electorate if they had a
real choice. Two of them having organised
voting in which electors are left considerable
freedom will provide important pointers to the
political stake in truly free elections.
76. Their governments were imposed, indi-
rectly at least, by the Soviet Union which pro-
vides them with firm support in face of public
opinion which is, to say the least, uncertain. The
presence of Soviet armed forces on the territory
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of four of them is a strong element of pressure on
the people, who can still remember 1956 and
1968, and on the governments. At one and the
same time, the latter are encouraged to follow the
Soviet model and its evolution in order to retain
Soviet support and to slow down internal
reforms if they feel there is popular pressure
which might place them in difficulty. This
pressure seems particularly strong in Poland in
view of the country's present serious economic
crisis. It is latent in the German Democratic
Republic, where the population is very sensitive
about everything that happens in the Federal
Republic. It seems less strong in Hungary, where
the Kadar Government, although a result of the
1956 repression, and then that of Mr. Grosz have
for a long time been practising a tolerant internal
policy, allowing, discreetly and to a limited
extent, some degree of economic freedom which
has allowed some of its inhabitants to gf,ow
wealthy in spite of a disastrous situation at state
level. Relations of all kinds with Hungary's Aus-
trian neighbour have also been developed, as
have exchanges with Western Europe which they
are now asking not to leave them on one side. At
the Davos economic symposium in February
1989, Mr. Grosz is even believed to have
expressed the wish to expand flrrngaryos relations
with, among others, WEU.
77. But in these countries there is some degree
of contradiction between granting gxeater free-
dom and internal stability. Without stability, Mr.
Gorbachev's whole policy may be called in
question, and if opposition is too pronounced,
the very results of this policy in the people's
democracies will be in doubt. Furthermore, sys-
tematic exploitation of the economies of the peo-
ple's democracies to help to develop the Soviet
Union makes it difficult to restore economic
freedom in these countries just when the Soviet
Union is trying to improve its own economy.
78. The West must not neglect the delicate sit-
uation in the Eastern European countries which
places it too in an uncomfortable position.
Western Europe cannot lgnore the hopes of
greater freedom which have emerged particularly
strikingly in Poland in the last ten years and in
Czechoslovakia. Nor, however, can it wish the
Eastern European countries to be destabilised as
this would endanger Mr. Gorbachev's Gov-
ernment and the policy he has inaugurated. In
the long run, the evolution of the Soviet Union is
the main historical factor because there can be
no real transformations in the other eastern
countries if perestroika is not a success in the
Soviet Union.
79. This remark implies that the western
countries should view with @ution the Soviet
proposal to build a common European house. It
must not be rejected but its future shape must be
clearly defined. In this connection, the CSCE has
accomplished, in particular during its long
session in Vienna which came to an end in
January 1989 after more than two years' work,
remarkable preparatory work defining realistic
elements for a rapprochement between the two
halves of Europe in the coming decade.
(b) Relations between Eastern and Western Europe
O Economic relations
80. In the last twenty years, the Soviet Union
has developed its external trade significantly.
Since 1970, it has increased sixfold and at the
same time its trading channels and the geo-
graphical structure of its external economic rela-
tions were diversified. However, the Soviet
authorities were far from satisfied with the situ-
ation. They now know that the scale, structure
and form of the Soviet Union's external trade
and economic and technological reldtions to date
were hardly commensurate with the country's
requirements and new aims and the machinery
of these relations had to be fundamentally
restructured to take account of changes
throughout the economy. Parallel with other
sectors of the economy, the reorganisation of
external trade was one of Mr. Gorbachev's first
areas of action. To this end, in his speech in
London on 7th April, he confirmed his will to
integrate the Soviet economy into the world
economy:
* Our economic reform presupposes the
Soviet Unionos closer integration into the
world economy and may be conducive to
building a truly global market and a new
world economic order. In recent years we
have seen the emergence of real opportun-
ities to close the last page of post-war
history and enter into a new period of
peace. "
81. In the Soviet Union, changes related first
to central bodies responsible for external trade.
For instancl, d u State Committee for External
Economic Relations' was set up in the ffame-
work of the Soyiet Council of Ministers. External
trade activities were also affected by the
reorganisation of the Soviet banking system
aimed at the diversification and sectorial
specialisation of that system. The main purpose
of introducing this new machinery was to create
a closer link between the domestic economy and
the world economic situation.
82. As a result of these changes, the devel-
opment of the Soviet trading landscape is
therefore now in full swing. On 9th June 1988,
this led to the establishment of official relations
between the EEC and the CMEA after thirty
years during which they had ignored each other.
This was followed, on 25th June, by a decla-
ration of mutual recognition within the context
of the Soviet proposal for a common European
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house. This agreement, concluded in spite of dis-
agreement over West Berlin, is important for
allowing the East to benefit more from economic
co-operation with Western Europe. At this stage,
the CMEA countries are mainly seeking to
develop co-operation in eight principal areas, i.e.
protection of the environment, transport, tech-
nical standards, science and technology, energy,
nuclear energy, statistics and economic fore-
casting. In the Soviet Union, the state monopoly
ofexternal trade having been seriously called in
question, barriers between Soviet producers and
the western business world are tending to be
lowered.
83. As well as central bodies of the old type,
ministries, state committees, firms and pro-
duction unions, co-operatives, associations,
banks, towns and the new joint capital fi.rms
have become potential direct partners for
western firms. Even more important, all those
playrng an economic role, whether or not they
are able to negotiate directly on external markets,
now have the right to use fairly freely any con-
vertible crurency they have earned from exports.
But everything is not yet possible: the non-
convertibility of the rouble and the absence of a
domestic market are still strong brakes on the
development of trade.
84. At the end of 1988, the Soviet Gov-
ernment nevertheless decided to implement a
three-stage plan to bring the parity ofthe rouble
down to a more realistic level compared with
western currencies. The official rouble used in
commercial transactions will be devalued by
about 500/o on lst January 1990. Indeed, your
Rapporteur noted that the convertibility of the
rouble and the external debt were being keenly
discussed in the Soviet Union. Some were advo-
cating a shock effect by swift, radical measures to
give impetus to the Soviet economy. Others con-
sider it would be wiser to advance step by step
allowing for transitional stages. Furthermore,
Soviet firms will be able to use up to 100/o of their
western currency to import goods from the West.
They will be able to exchange part of it on a cur-
rency market that is to be set up. On lst January
1991, the present system of coefficients, which
are exchange rates specific to each product, is to
be abandoned.
85. In Western Europe, the Soviet Union's
first partner is the Federal Republic (200/o of the
Soviet market), followed by Italy (ll0lo) and
France (9.4o/o). To enable these relations to be
developed, the emphasis has been placed onjoint firms with Soviet and western capital,
which was impossible as long as the Soviet
Union intended to maintain total state control
over economic activity. Several agreements have
been concluded in this framework, first with
large firms, but files are now being discussed
which relate to small and medium-sized firms.
To encourage western investment, Moscow has
decided to ease many of the constraints: western
investors will now be able to have a majority
share-holding in these firms, their share having
previously been limited to 49o/o,labour laws will
be made more flexible, foreigners will be able to
run such firms and customs tariffs on products
they have to import will be reduced.
86. Apart from this new type of co-operation,
East-West relations are based mainly on a
network of bilateral agreements. They started
with the conclusion of trade agreements
developed with effect from 1959, which were
generally signed for a five-year period and com-
pleted by annual protocols listing the products to
be exchanged. They were quite short, defining
the general framework for mutual trade, and
almost always included a most-favoured-nation
clause. The EEC is empowered to sign or renew
trade agreements with a third country on behalf
of member states in accordance with the
common trade policy. Today, the bilateral
framework of East-West relations consists of
co-operation agreements whose implementation
includes a vast network of institutions. Finally,
there are agreements on specific matters: credit
agreements, prolonged by banking application
protocols, fiscal conventions, etc., and very
many framework agreements concluded between
large western industrial gloups and the relevant
administrations in the socialist countries.
87. The development of East-West trade
clearly requires decentralisation of decision-
taking at the level of firms and the direct use of
currencies for the necessary compensation. Con-
versely, the Soviet Union and its allies complain
that too many products are included on Cocom
lists of items the West must not export. The
development of perestroika alone should remoye
these two obstacles. Autonomy for fi.rms, a
return to a certain amount of price freedom in
the Soviet Union itself and an increase in the
number of joint firms authorised to purchase
equipment directly from western countries
should sweep away many economic barriers to
the development of trade, and a fall in the pro-
portion of militarily-related research and pro-
duction in the Soviet Union should encourage
the West to cut its Cocom commitments, which
apparently are evaded with increasing fre-
quency.
(iil Vienna Conference on Securily and
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
88. The thirty-five participants (the whole of
Europe except Albania, plus the United States
and Canada) in the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe, which had been meeting
in Vienna since 1986, adopted the concluding
document of the conference by consensus on
15th January 1989. Frovision was made for ten
follow-up conferences between now and the
fourth rerriew conference that is to be opened in
Helsinki on24th March 1992. Annexed to it is
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the mandate for the twenty-three NATO and
Warsaw Pact member countries to start, on 6th
March 1989, negotiations on the reduction of
armed forces in Europe. It contains three
chapters or baskets relating to security in Europe,
economic, scientific and technological co-opera-
tion and, finally, co-operation in humanitarian
matters.
89. On the first basket, i.e. security, the NATO
and Warsaw Pact countries agreed to start nego-
tiations in Vienna during the week of 6th March
aimed at strengthening stability and security in
Europe through the establishment at lower levels
of a stable, sure balance of conventional armed
forces. Dual-capacity nuclear and conventional
arms will also be negotiated. Furthermore, talks
will be continued on security- and confidence-
building measures in Europe for extending what
was achieved at the Stockholm disarmament
conference which ended in September 1986.
These talks will take over from the mutual and
balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) between
the two alliances which lasted for fifteen years
without success. In spite of the absence of results,
a joint communiqu6 by the two blocs affirmed
that'these negotiations have helped to maintain
a serious dialogue between East and West on
security issues... The extent of common ground
has proved to be insufficient to enable the partic-
ipants to aglee on a treaty'.
90. The negotiations on conventional armed
forces in Europe (CFE) and on confidence- and
security-buikling measures (CSBM) were started
in Vienna on 9th March 1989. The first stage of
these negotiations ended on 24th March with an
agreement on the negotiating mandate.
91. In regard to CFE, the positions of the two
alliances are fairly close, although there are still
some differences. The first possible remark is
that there is a joint will to reduce asymmetries by
unequal reductions of the two sides' forces (5 to
100/o for the West, l0 to 150/o for the East). They
also agreed on the need to concentrate their
efforts first on forces capable of launching sur-
prise attacks. The third point of agreement is
acceptance of the principle of on-site inspections.
Points on which they differ relate to:
O Zones or corridors. The West has pro-
posed dividing the territory from the Atlantic to
the Urals into four concentric zones, while the
East prefers demilitarised corridors at the inter-
section of the two blocs.
(i, Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact wants
tactical aircraft and combat helicopters to be
included in the negotiations.
(iiil The East wishes to include the reduction
of troop levels in the negotiations, which the
West considers to be a secondary matter.
(iv) Finally, the figures published by the two
allies on levels of troops and the principal arma-
ments differ considerably.
Although it is still too early to judge, it is certain
that, for the first time, there is a vast area of
agreement between East and West which will
facilitate the negotiations and the Soviet author-
ities told your Rapporteur that they wanted them
to succeed. Recognition of asymmetries and
assertion of the need to remedy them can open
the door to agreement on the step-by-step
reduction in the level of forces and arms on both
sides, leaving the way open for new relations
between the two blocs based on mutual confi-
dence.
92. Where CSBM are concerned, the Warsaw
Pact considers the West's proposals to be too
modest. The West is proposing the implemen-
tation of a random inspection procedure to
assess the information supplied, but rejecting
Warsaw Pact proposals to introduce constraints
in the two sides'military manoeuvres. However,
the idea of a dialogue on the two sides' military
doctrines has been adopted. For this purpose, on
a German-Polish initiative, a seminar is to be
held in the Federal Republic from 2lst to 24th
June.
93. However, Mr. Gorbachev made his posi-
tions clear in his speech in London on 7th April.
After announcing the shutdown of two reactors
producing enriched uranium for military pur-
poses, he did not hesitate to say that the pursuit
of the Vienna negotiations might well be affected
if NATO continued its tactical nuclear weapons
'o modernisation " programme. Today, therefore,
the West must look closely at the future of the
Vienna negotiations in view of the Soviet
IJnion's veiled threat to call in question the
detente that has been achieved in East-West rela-
tions.
94. The area of application of the new negotia-
tions covers all the territory of the participants in
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals including
offshore European territory. The mandate pro-
vides for exchanges of information and verifi-
cation, including on-site inspection.
95. The second basket, on economic co-oper-
ation, attracted little attention. Many countries,
including the United States, consider that the
CSCE is not an.appropriate framework for dis-
cussing economic matters. However, the pro-
tection of the environment was on the agenda:
natural and ecological disasters, in particular in
the Soviet lJnion, have revived interest in such
matters on which it is planned to hold another
conference in Sofia.
96. The thfud basket, relating mainly to
human rights, reflects the new thinking of the
eastern countries. In spite of reservations by
Romania, which considers that some of the pro-
visions of the concluding document open the
way to interference in the internal affairs of other
states and the violation of independence and
national sovereignty and encourage retrograde
activities in opposition to reform, the final doc-
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ument shows that considerable progress has been
made in this area. The East made major conces-
sions in human rights and the West ag;reed to a
conference on the subject being held in Moscow.
Furthermore, out of respect for glasnost, the
Soviet leaders announced that the document
would be made public in the Soviet Union.
97. The third basket contains a whole series of
detailed undertakings relating to religious
freedom, the rights of minorities, free movement
of persons and the right of prisoners to humane
treatment, in particular a ban on psychiatric
treatment dispensed for non-medical reasons.
The executive committee of the World Psychi-
atric Association has therefore provisionally
readmitted the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia
and Bulgaria, which had left the association in
1983. Bi- and multilateral controls will be con-
ducted. The states concerned will have to answer
requests for information from other states on
humanitarian matters. Representatives of the
orthodox church also gave your Rapporteur
extremely favourable testimonies regarding the
practice of religious freedom.
98. Thus, the CSCE, as it developed at the
Vienna conference, has become an important
part ofinternational order in Europe. It provides
the framework for many negotiations on specific
subjects such as the fight against pollution, Medi-
terranean problems and even settlement of the
Cyprus conflict, and it has also determined how
East and West are to try to settle the major issues
that had opposed them in earlier decades. It
therefore meets the wish frequently expressed by
the Soviet Union and its allies not to be left out
of the effort being made by Western Europeans
to organise their common destiny. In this way, it
forms the foundation of the common house
referred to by Mr. Gorbachev. Its evolution and
the place it will occupy in the history of Europe
will depend primarily on how perestroika is
pursued in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
99. One way or another, the notion of a
" common house " is still very vague, even to
many Soviet leaders who are wondering about
the nature, responsibilities and future of the
various international institutions established by
Western Europe before defining their position
towards them. The West has similar questions in
regard to the same matters. It should be rela-
tively easy to associate the eastern countries with
the activities of the Council of Europe once they
meet its constitutional criteria. Furthermore, the
respective positions of WEU and NATO on the
one hand and of the Warsaw Pact on the other
are clear enough to allow a dialogue between rep-
resentatives of the two organisations at executive
level and at the level of the WEU Assembly and
the parliaments of the Warsaw Pact countries,
since the Warsaw Pact has no parliamentary
assembly. There have also been exchanges
between the European Parliament and certain
eastern countries. But, in the long run, making
them instruments of co-operation or dialogue
depends on whether or not the European Council
and the European Parliament choose to handle
security questions. The Soviet authorities did not
conceal from your Rapporteur that they reserved
their position on this point.
Y. The Soviet Union and the world
100. Detente in Europe would obviously be
unthinkable if not accompanied by a far-reaching
change in relations between the Soviet Union
and the West throughout the world. For geo-
graphical and historical reasons, Western Europe
certainly depends very largely on its relations
with the various parts of the world and, in par-
ticular, its maritime trade, while the Soviet
Union, a continental power with relatively
underdeveloped external trade, is rightly con-
cerned not to have its rare outlets to the open sea
closed, although it does not depend to the same
degree on its maritime connections. Its claim for
equality with the West in naval armaments
therefore seems unrealistic. On the other hand, it
has, and in recent decades has used, means of
disturbing international order and world trade in
a manner that interfered considerably with the
western economy and above all that of Western
Europe, dependent on imports of certain essen-
tial products such as oil and exports for its eco-
nomic development.
101. It would obviously be childish to see " the
hand of Moscow " behind all the conflicts that
have torn the third world apart since 1945 or
even behind all the Westos misfortunes. The
Soviet Union has never had the means necessary
for taking the place of the western countries and
in reality has tried to do so in only a small
number of cases but it has, by various means,
exploited the West's difficulties in the world and
armed those who tried to make it lose some of its
important positions.
102. A journalist, referring to world events in
1988, spoke of an 'epidemic of peace ". Many
conflicts around the world have calmed down
and, even if lasting solutions have not been
found, rapprochements and negotiations have
started. It would be very exaggerated to attribute
this solely to Mr. Gorbachev's policy, but his
cautious, realistic, moderate policy has certainly
made a valid cohtribution, if only because those
who wished to disturb the peace were unable to
rely on Soviet support, thus encouraging them to
find compromises.
(a) The Middlc East
103. This is a particularly sensitive area for the
Soviet Union, a great Moslem power with
lengthy frontiers with several Middle East coun-
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tries and populations of the same ethnic origins
on both sides of those frontiers. As a result, it
was not entirely free to exploit a situation which
might have been favourable because of the
decline of western influence since 1956, the fall
of the Shah of Iran and rising Islamic fundamen-
talism. By supporting nationalist movements
and keeping lsrael at a distance, the Soviet
Union managed to become momentarily recon-
ciled with certain countries in the region,
including Egypt in Nasser's day, Syria and Iraq,
and subsequently even Libya. It was unable to
gain a firm foothold, however, except, perhaps,
in Aden.
104. When Mr. Gorbachev came to power, the
Soviet Union had lost most of its credit in the
Islamic world because of the war it had been
wagrng in Afghanistan since it invaded the
country on27th December 1979 to try to keep in
place a communist government that had seized
office in a violent coup d'6tat in April 1978. The
action of the new Soviet leaders seems to have
had two aims: to put an end to the Afghan affair
which was becoming disastrous and to re-
establish Soviet influence in the region on new
bases, i.e. to try to terminate the various hostil-
ities splitting the country while ensuring that the
Soviet Union had a say in maintaining the peace
thus restored.
105. (i) In Afghanistan, as soon as he came to
power Mr. Gorbachev distinguished himself
from his predecessors by showing clearly that he
had no responsibility for this problem. At the
twenty-seventh party congress in February and
March 1986, he gave an assurance that the Soviet
Union wanted to find a political way out of the
conflict which would allow it to withdraw its
troops. From then on, there was definite progressin the indirect negotiations held in Geneva
between Pakistan and Afghanistan through the
intermediary of the United Nations. In March
1986, a first time-table for the withdrawal of
Soviet forces within forty-eight months was
issued in Kabul. In 1987, events speeded up. In
January, Mr. Shevardtadze, visiting Kabul, gave
an assurance that a political settlement was near.
In March, the Geneva negotiators reduced the
time-table to twenty-two and then eighteen
months and in the spring the Soviet Union
seems to have decided to withdraw its forces in
l 989.
106. On 8th April 1988, the last obstacles were
removed: the agreements were signed in Geneva
on l5th April 1988 under the auspices of the
United Nations. They consisted of four docu-
ments: two bilateral agreements between Afghan-
istan and Pakistan, a thfud on international guar-
antees and a fourth on mutual relations for
settling the situation, signsd by the four parties
and making it binding on the Soviet Union to
withdraw its troops within nine months as from
l5th May 1988, i.e. by 15th February 1989,
which it duly did. However, the texts make no
provision for an internal political settlement: on
one side there is Mr. Najibullah's r6gime estab-
lished by the Soviet Union and, on the other, the
resistance movement which was not involved in
the agreements and continues to fight the com-
munist rdgime in Kabul. In addition, the two
great powers are continuing their assistance, to
the government in the case of the Soviet Union
and to the rebellion in the case of the United
States, on the basis of 'positive symmetry ".
Afghanistan is therefore in an anarchical political
situation in which the resistance movement and
the authorities are still at blows. The Kremlin's
decision suggests that the Soviet Union had no
solution other than to recognise the failure of the
Brezhnev initiative. The Soviet Union has gone
back on one of its fundamental principles: the
irreversibility of r6gimes in countries where com-
munism has been established. It has abandoned
a member of the " socialist community " and has
not managed to control this small under-
developed country. It was a humiliating setback
for the Soviet Union to the detriment of the
prestige of the army, which was ill-prepared for
guerrilla warfare. Soviet losses, believed to
number 13 310 killed, 35 478 wounded and 311
missing, according to official figures, were not
tolerable for the Soviet population and' Mr.
Gorbachev showed he was capable of taking rea-
sonable decisions and enforcing them in spite of
opposition from the military leaders.
107. (ii) In the war between lran and lraq, lNlr.
Gorbachev tried to show the Soviet Union to be
a responsible state capable of promoting the set-
tlement of problems. Hitherto closely allied with
Iraq, its position has evolved since 1987 and
there was a noticeable improvement in its rela-
tions with Iran, inter alia on the occasion of the
meeting between Mr. Shevardnadze and Imam
Khomeini in Tehran on 26th February, when the
two said they were prepared to establish a strong
relationship vis-d-vis the western countries.
Although the Soviet Union refused, in spite of
United States pressure, to associate itself with
possible sanctions against Iran, in July 1987 it
voted for Security Council Resolution 598
calling for an immediate cease-fire and, in its
meetings with the two belligerent countries, con-
stantly affirmed its support for United Nations
efforts.
108. (iii) In the Lebanese conflict, the Soviet
Union now has a policy that is no longer limited
to support for Syria. On l4th January 1986, the
new Soviet Ambassador in Beirut met President
Gemayel when the latter had just rejected the
Damascus Agreement between the militias in the
region. But, above all, on lSth April 1986,
Moscow decided to help to finance UNIFIL: this
was a turning point in Soviet policy since the
Kremlin had hitherto always refused to endorse
the deployment of United Nations forces in
countries at war. Finally, in April 1989, the
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Soviet Union accepted the principle of a mission
of conciliation between the parties involved that
was assigned to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
109. (iv) In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mr.
Gorbachev was also anxious to show that he did
not wish Soviet policy to be dictated by either of
the parties involved. The fact that the Soviet
Union has so far refused to allow about two
million Soviet Jews to emigrate gives it a strong
means of exercising pressure on the antagonists.
He seems to be using this to promote a set-
tlement of the Middle East crisis. on the one
hand, the Soviet Union is categorically opposed
to the policy offorce and annexation pursued by
Israel in the occupied territories and, on the
other, it is offering Israel a resumption of normal
diplomatic relations on certain conditions. Thus,
Mr. Gorbachev has stated that an international
conference on the restoration of peace in the
Middle East was the only way of ending the
deadlock and recalled that, for Moscow, set-
tlement of the crisis required Israel to return the
annexed Arab territories and recognise the legit-
imate rights of Palestinians. Early in 1988, the
Soviet Union adjusted its position since, for the
first time since 1967, an Israeli delegation was
invited to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the
number of visas granted to Jewish emigrants has
increased significantly, thus heralding a slow
thaw in Israeli-Soviet relations.
110. The Soviet lJnion's return to the Middle
East stage was demonstrated bY Mr.
Shevardnadze's ten-day tour of the region. He
met Mr. Alens, Israeli Foreign Minister, and Mr.
Arafat, Leader of the PLO. In spite of talks that
were described as constructive and the prospect
of further meetings, the contacts between Mr.
Shevardnadze and Mr. Arens did not remove the
obstacles to the opening ofnegotiations on a set-
tlement in the Middle East, Israel still being
opposed to the idea of an international con-
ference on the subject. A big step had never-
theless been taken since a meeting had been held
between two countries which had had no diplo-
matic relations for twenty years.
111. At the same time, however, links with the
PLO were tightened: Yasser Arafat paid an
official visit to the Soviet Union in April 1988
for the first time in five years. During his visit,
Mr. Gorbachev exhorted him to be realistic and
to recognise Israel's " security interests ", which
was certainly not without influence on the PLO's
proposals implying recognition of Israel.
ll2. (v/ Diplomatic action in regard to Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Jordan has also been
important, marked in particular by the visit to
Moscow in January 1988 of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, representing the
Gulf Co-operation Council, and the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Egypt in May 1988, no such
visits at this level having taken place since the
1976 estrangement. The importance of links
between the Soviet Union and Jordan was
underlined when King Hussein was received in
the Soviet Union in December 1987 and his
Prime Minister in March 1988. It can thus be
seen that in the Middle East the Soviet Union is
tryrng to regain a foothold in that area of the
world from which it had been absent for some
time. Its approach has now changed and there
are definite signs of the Soviet lJnion's wish to
be seen as a promoter of peace.
A) The Far East
ll3. It was quite normal for the Soviet Union
to register the considerable economic devel-
opment of the countries along the western shores
of the Pacific. This induced it to build up a
strong naval presence in the area and to become
closely associated with Vietnam, which granted
it a naval base at Cam Ranh. On the other hand,
the deterioration of relations between the Soyiet
Union and China placed a limit on its ambitions
and made it deploy large numbers of land, air
and nuclear forces in Central and Eastern Asia.
ll4. Mr. Gorbachev's Government seems to
have realised both the extent of Soviet ilterests
in the area and the need to change its policy. It
did this in a spectacular manner by choosing
Vladivostok to announce one of its most
important disarmament proposals. A principal
aim was to restore normal relations with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, which was probably
facilitated by the fact that Deng Xiaoping had,
since his return to power, started a trend which
bears some relation to what was to be perestroika
in the Soviet Union. However, China set three
conditions for reconciliation with Moscow: the
evacuation of Afghanistan, a significant
reduction in Soviet forces along Chinese fron-
tiers and the restoration of an independent Cam-
bodia. Everything indicates that it has obtained
satisfaction in these three areas and that a forth-
coming visit by Mr. Gorbachev to Beijing should
mark the start of a new stage in Sino-Soviet rela-
tions.
115. In regard to Cambodia, the two meetings
held in Paris in December 1987 and January
1988 between Prince Sihanouk, leader of the
resistance against Vietnam, composed of the
Khmer Rouge, the FNLPK and supporters of




the Soviet Union and its allies 
- 
were perhaps
the first hint of a settlement. The two men agreed
on recognising the need for national reconcili-
ation which would allow Cambodia to become
independent agair,. Vietnam subsequently con-
firmed its intention to withdraw its troops from
Cambodia in 1990 and, in May 1988, announced
that it would withdraw 500 000 men at the end
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of the year. The first meeting between represen-
tatives of the three factions: resistance
movement, Cambodian Government and
Vietnam, was held in Indonesia on 25th July
1988.
116. Thus, after thirty years of crisis, China and
the Soviet Union have at last normalised their
relations. In the night of 5th to 6th February
1989, Beijing announced an official visit by Mr.
Gorbachev from l5th to 18th May. Just before
the official announcement of this visit, China
and the Soviet Union had issued a joint
communique on Cambodia speciffing that
China was in favour of establishing a provisional
coalition government led by Prince Sihanouk
and with four-party representation, whereas the
Soviet Union rejected the word 'o govemment "
and preferred " provisional body under the
authority of Sihanouk ", although this body
would not be dependent on any foreign party.
The Soviet Union and China thus took note of
the difference between them in regard to the
form of provisional administration to be set upprior to elections and after the withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops. In spite of everything,
Moscow and Beijing agreed on the main issue:
they wish to avoid any dangerous situation
which might lead to civil war after the with-
drawal of Vietnam.
ll7. To this end, mutual concessions were
made by both the parties involved. Beijing
undertook not to support the Khmer Rouge if
they returned to powei and Moscow underiook
to reduce its troops along the Chinese frontien
260 000 men will be evacuated from the Soviet
frontier sectors and three-quarters of Soyiet
forces in Outer Mongolia, the remaining units
being redeployed in a defensive posture. To
make implementation of the rapprochement
more effective, China and the Soviet Union con-
sidered setting up joint bodies to reduce frontier
tension and accepted the need for international
control procedure, possibly under United
Nations auspices.
118. In these matters, Mr. Gorbachev saw that
the Brezhnev policy had cost the Soviet Union a
great deal diplomatically and economically: the
factions which had seized power in Cambodia
with its support failed to retain control and set-
tlement of that conflict would allow the Soviet
Union to reactivate its policy in the third world
on new bases. Moreover, to this end it is pur-
suing a more open policy towards the ASEAN
countries and India and Japan.
fully aware that it did not have the necessary
naval and logistic means, it has always avoided a
direct clash since the Cuban affair faced it with
an impossible choice. No fundamental change isyet discernible in Soviet policy since Mr.
Gorbachev came to power, but there are already
signs of a change.
120. Cuba is still the Soviet Union's principal
ally in the region but Fidel Castro is apparently
sceptical about the perestroika experiment and ii
wary of any concessions Moscow might make.
Cuba has always tried to behave as an inde-
pendent power and not just a Soviet satellite.
This was probably the case when Fidel Castro
selt troops to Angola in 1975 without apparently
referring to Moscow.
l2l. In reaction to the reformist policy of the
Soviet leader, Fidel Castro put an end to the
timid attempts at opening the Cuban system
started ten years ago. It was in 1968, following
the missile crisis, that Cuba started to draw
closer to the Soviet Union. In 1970 a Soviet-
Cuban intergovernmental commission for eco-
nomic, scientific and technical co-operation was
set up and then, two years later, Cuba acceded to
the CMEA. Between 1960 and 1980, the Soviet
Union is estimated to have spent the equivalent
of $20 000 million to support the Cuban
economy, assistance in the second half of the
eighties being $5 000 million per year.
122. Nevertheless, the Cuban economy is in a
permanent state of crisis. The cut in oil prices
decided by OPEC and the falling dollar have
reduced its income from the re-exportation of
Soviet oil, this being one of the last economic
advantages the Soviet Union accorded to Cuba.
The Cubans sometimes criticise Soviet aid,
which they consider to be often unsuitable and
harmful to their economy, and would like to
increase exchanges with western countries, par-
ticularly as the last agreement signed by the
Soviet Union and Cuba for the period 1986-90 is
less advantageous than earter ones (in particularfor sugar, which represents 93o/o of Soviet
imports from Cuba). It would appear, however,
that the two countries have decided to continue
to co-operate.
123. Mr. Gorbachev therefore made an official
visit to Cuba, starting on 2nd April 1989. While
denying having a military eye on South America,
he said he was in favour of developing economic,
political, cultural and technical exchanges with
the entire area. In spite ofdifferences ofviews, in
particular on perestroika, the visit showed that
Soviet-Cuban relations were still satisfactory.
The Soviet leader made no statement opposingMr. Castro's policy. On the contrary, Mr.
Gorbachev endorsed Havana's support for
Managua, thereby condemning United States
assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, in spite of
Washington's request to Moscow to approach
Cuba to help to find a peaceful settlement in Nic-
(c) The westem hemisphere
I19. In Latin America, the Soviet Union has
constantly supported governments or armed
movements opposing the excessive influence of
the United States in that vast area. However,
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araglta. Mr. Gorbachev even refrained from
saying anything about the fate of Cuban dissi-
dents, two of whose principal leaders were
arrested during a peaceful demonstration in front
of the Soviet Embassy in Cuba. The two allies
also signed a 1'reaty of friendship and
co-operation. Finally, by stating his opposition
'o to the export of the revolution or counter-
revolution ", to the gratification of the West, and
asserting that conflicts in Central America
should be solved by political means in a Latin
American framework, Mr. Gorbachev presented
himself as a potential partner in Latin American
affairs.
124. The Soviet Union is still present elsewhere
in the West Indies in spite of the American
invasion of the island of Grenada in 1983, which
Moscow criticised very sharply. Although not
having taken part in Haitian politics since the
fall of the Duvalier family in 1986, the Soviet
Union is making overtures to Jamaica, a parlia-
mentary delegation having visited that country
in May 1988 for the first time in the history of
Soviet diplomacy. According to Soviet leaders,
this visit was intended to establish contacts with
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago.
125. On 18th September 1979, the Soviet
Union and Nicaragu4 established diplomatic
relations. Yet the Kremlin is hesitant about
becoming more involved in the civil war and
supports the Sandinist Government but Soviet
assistance to Nicaragua is still conditional and
limited: $330 million in 1985, mainly in the form
of oil, and $300 million in 1987.
126. For the Soviet Union, El Salvador is not a
problem and it hesitates to become involved in
the civil war. Its support for the guerrillas is in
fact merely verbal.
127. Tours by Mr. Shevardnadze, Soviet Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, of Brazil, Argentina and
Uruguay in September and October 1987, after a
visit to Mexico the previous year which attracted
much attention, revived speculation about
Moscow's renewed interest in the American con-
tinent. Soviet penetration is possible, however,
only because ofthe growing independence ofthe
Latin American countries vis-d-vis the United
States.
128. The need for friendly relations between
the Soviet Union and Argentina is due mainly to
the latter's strategic importance in the South
Atlantic. Argentina's main aim is to ensure that
the Soviet market continues to be an outlet for
its agricultural produce. In 1982, the Soviet
Union had supported Argentina in the Falklands
crisis. In 1987, Moscow signed an agreement
with Buenos Aires on fishing in the Falklands
area, i.e. in waters the United Kingdom con-
siders are its own. Soviet support for Argentine
diplomacy allows it to ensure a presence in the
South Atlantic, an area of strategic importance.
129. ln Brazil, economic co-operation with the
Soviet Union has been growing since the sev-
enties. Starting in 1974, the Soviet Union
encouraged a move by the Brazilian military,
who broke offtheir military agreements with the
United States h 1977. In 1981, co-operation
between the two countries entered a new stage
with the Brazilian Planning Minister's visit to
Moscow accompanied by 150 businessmen. In
1987-88, agreements were signed between the
two countries relating to major infrastructure
projects. When the Brazilian head of state visited
Moscow in October 1988, Mr. Gorbachev
expressed his wish to see bilateral relations
develop.
130. The Soviet Union developed its relations
with Pmt while the latter had a military gov-
ernment: military equipment, conditions
favourable to the Soviet Union for reimbursing
the Peruvian foreign debt. The same is true of
Bolivia with which mining and hydroelectric
projects are being established.
(d) Africa
131. The African continent has never been one
of the Soviet Union's main concerns but, as else-
where, it has supported nationalist movements
hostile to colonisation, just as it now supports
states and moyements opposing South Africa
while avoiding direct military involvement.
Nevertheless, there is now an improvement in
relations between the Soviet Union and South
Africa, due in particular to South Africaos new
attitude towards the Namibian question. There
is an increasing number of meetings and contacts
between Moscow and Pretoria, which allows
each party's intentions to be better understood.
Moscow considers this to be a means of playing a
constructive r6le in the region, in particular to
facilitate a return to peace in Mozambique. Its
attempts to take over from the West as an eco-
nomic partner of recently-independent countries
have not been successful for lack of means and
experience. Its most effective action seems to
have been the training of African students in its
universities.
132. The situation evolved in 1975. The change
started with the independence of Angola,
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, for only the
Soviet Union and the states of the " socialist
community " remained loyal to African natio-
nalists by grving them arms, training and
material assistance. These countries had privi-
leged diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union. ln 1977, Mozambique signed a twenty-
year treaty of friendship and co-operation with
the Soviet Union. Although Africa is of necessity
turning mainly to the West, the Soviet Union
nevertheless tries to keep a foot on the continent
and improve its prestige there. For this purpose,it has resumed relations with Somalia,
encouraged its Ethiopian ally to find a political
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solution to its conflict with the Eritrean rebels
and re-established diplomatic relations with the
Central African Republic.
133. The scene of its main activities is still
Angola, however. Since 1975, there has been a
civil war between the Luanda Government, sup-
ported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and
IINITA, assisted by the United States and South
Africa. Steps taken by the United States Gov-
ernment since 1983 to put an end to this war
brought a successful conclusion on 2nd May
1988. The talks which were then started in
London between Angola, Cuba and South Africa
and which were continued in Brazzaville, Cairo
and then New York led, on 13th July, to an
agxeement of principle providing for the with-
drawal of Cuban troops (45 000 men) from
Angola and the independence of Namibia whose
decolonisation is still meeting with opposition.
There are still many problems to be solved such
as the time-table for the withdrawal of Cuban
troops and UNITA's place. But this agreement,
which should be followed by a cease-fire, marks
the start of a peace process which has every
chance of progressing if supported by the two
great powers. In any event, it shows the Soviet
Union will not allow itself to become involved in
a conflict with no way out. If it is settled, this will
perhaps allow the Soviet Union to reactivate its
policy in Africa on new bases.
(e) The United States and thc Sovia Union
134. Two summit meetings in the space of six
months, in Washington in December 1987 and
then during Mr. Reagan's visit to the Soviet
Union in June 1988, the first for fourteen years
apart from those held in Geneva and Reykjavikin 1985-86, confirmed the rapprochement
between the two great powers. Apart from nego-
tiations on military matters, this dialogue is
leading to a revival ofbilateral co-operation. A
lumber of agreements have been signed relatinginter alia to oceanographic research, culture and
conductingjoint nuclear tests. Trade, on the con-
trary, does not seem to be developing, probably
because ofthe Soviet lJnion's lack offoreign cur-
rency. The Soviet Union has taken advantage of
this atmosphere of d6tente to ask for the repeal
of the Jackson Amendment which links the
granting by the United States of a most-
favoured-nation clause to freedom of emigration
and the possibility of acquiring advanced tech-
nology. Under European pressure, the Amer-
icans even agreed in January 1988 to Cocom lists
being shortened. They also proposed that a
standing conference of American and Soviet par-
liamentarians study human rights.
135. Rather than economic questions, it is the
attitude shown by Mr. Gorbachev towards dis-
armament and the settlement of most world
problems directly or indirectly bringing the
United States and the Soviet Union into oppo-
sition which prompted a far-reaching change in
the views of American public opinion about the
Soviet Union in general and Mr. Gorbachev in
particular. For the fust time, the principal Soviet
leader is really popular in the United States, and
this is confirmed by all the opinion polls.
136. This is an important fact that Europe must
not ignore, because it means that, whatever the
intentions of the new American administration,
it will have to take this into account. It will no
longer be able to use the persistence ofthe threat
as an argument for obtaining the funds it needs
for its defence policy. It will be facing strong
pressure to withdraw at least some of the
American forces stationed in Europe and to com-
plete negotiations on the various aspects ofdis-
armament. However, speaking la t$/nshingfon on
6th March, President Bush rejected the proposal
made by certain Congressmen to withdraw
25 000 American troops from Europe.
137. The new United States Secretary of State,
Mr. Baker, is to visit Moscow on l0th and I lthMay 1989. He is to be received by Mr.
Shevardnadze and the meeting will allow them
to review the main matters of concern to the two
great powers. The development of a friendly rela-
tionship with the United States is doubtless one
of Mr. Gorbachev's principal aims because it is
necessary for the consolidation ofpeace and the
success of disarmament and because it would
support his position in the Soviet Union itself
where public opinion reacts to these prospects.
The Western European countries have to realise
that the two great powers very rightly attribute
vital importance to the search for agreement
between themselves and that the truly European
aspects of international relations are secondary,
in politico-military matters at least.
VI. Conclusions
138. Mr. Gorbachev's action has clearly
brought about a far-reaching change in interna-
tional relations as a whole. The very fact that it
will take a long time for perestroika to achieve
significant economic results seems to be encour-
aging the Soviet leaders to seek the support they
need in successes of a more political nature.
Apart from internal liberalisation, an important
part of their message is to discard the concept
that war is inevitable and to endorse universal
values in foreign policy. It can now be seen that
the new Soviet policy is coherent, breaks deliber-
ately with the past and really helps to establish a
new international order.
139. Since the revolution in 1917, the problem
of collective security had been seen in ierms of
confrontation which made all attempts to
organise stable peaceful coexistence quite haz-
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ardous. Mr. Gorbachev's new policy seems to
wish to set joint European security on quite dif-
ferent foundations according to which arms limi-
tation would no longer be considered as a stage
in a test of force but as a means of ensuring sta-
bility with the security of all concerned being
guaranteed. If the renouncement of offensive
strategy and of the possibility of a first strike is
confirmed, these measures should allow a return
to confidence no longer based on illusion. His
words must now be translated into deeds more
clearly than has been the case so far and the con-
tinuity of external policy must be effectively
ensured.
140. This is the context in which now essential
thought should be given to the nature and
vocation of the Atlantic Alliance. Designed as
the instrument of collective defence in a time of
antagonism, it must be adapted to new circum-
stances and develop the wherewithal to become
the organisation for western partipation in this
collective security system. When it was nec-
essary, it managed to organise sufficient
deployment to give its members' armaments
their full deterrent value. It was also sufficiently
defensive for the Soviet Union to see, at the
appropriate time, that it was not a real threat. It
must now find a way of retaining enough deter-
rence to discourage any new Soviet change of
tack while associating all its members with the
arms limitation process with a view to achieving
a new, reciprocal and shared security system that
conforms to the joint interests of eastern and
western countries. Whereas the Soviet Union is
now showing coherence in its strategy, external
policy and logic, the West does not yet seem to
have made the necessary effort, as Mr. Pierre
Harmel urged it to do in his paper at the
Florence colloquy, to reach a consensus on the
principles which should underly its military
deployment, political action and language. One
of WEU's main tasks should be to help to find
the necessary cohesion ofthe alliance in the new
situation.
l4l. It is with these two prospects in mind that
the United States is starting to tackle the
question of modernising its strategic arms, for
instance in the context of the report on
" Deterring through the turn of the century " just
issued by a group of members of Congress from
both parties led by Senator Sam Nunn and Rep-
resentative Les Aspin, Chairmen of the Armed
Services Committees ofthe two houses. The con-
clusions of this report advocate a reduction in
the number of ground-launched strategic mis-
siles, the search for an agreement banning multi-
warhead missiles and the development of mis-
siles on mobile launchers with cruise missiles
installed on surface craft and MX missiles that
can be moved throughout the United States road
network. The report also proposes modernising
very short-range Lance missiles and suggests
slowing down the SDI programme. This corres-
ponds to the intentions already announced by
the new Secretary of Defence, Mr. Richard
Cheney, who is proposing a considerable
reduction in the budget for this programme over
the next few years. Finally, a probably essential
factor is that the United States leaders now seem
to have grasped the dimensions of the transfor-
mations effected in the Soviet Union and to be
considering the possibility of more general
agreement with the Soviet Union on organising
and consolidating international peace.
142. For Western Europe, however, the Soviet
Union will remain a powerful, strongly-armed
neighbour for many more years. Even if disarm-
ament conferences achieve the sought-after
results relatively quickly, it will still take time for
the disarmament measures decided upon to be
effectively applied. For instance, the Soviet
Union says it will take ten years to destroy its
stocks of chemical weapons. During this long
period, Western Europe cannot be satisfied with
agreements and fine words as a basis for its
security. It will have to keep its deterrent capa-
bility intact, with the participation of the United
States, as long as possible. This is particularly
necessary since none of the negotiations now
being held is likely to lead to a real reduction in
the strength of the two great powers in terms of
strategic missiles since the 500/o reduction
envisaged in the START talks will not affect
their first and second strike capability. Rather
than the number of missiles each of the great
powers will retain, it is their global policy and the
development of the East-West dialogue that can
be the starting point for true disarmament.
143. Europeans will, however, have first to con-
centrate on non-deterrent arrns in order to reach
early agreements on banning the production,
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on
substantial, duly-verified reductions in conven-
tional weapons so as to establish a balance
between the capability of each side and then to
reduce the level of that capability by stages. At
the present juncture, short-range nuclear
weapons are part of the deterrent because they
prevent any dangerous calculation being made
on the basis of Soviet conventional superiority.
The day that superiority disappears, the need for
this deterrence would be eclipsed and it would
become possible for such weapons to be reduced
or even eliminated. It seems desirable here and
now to examine in what conditions NATO might
be able to renounce the modernisation of Lance
missiles without too much risk.
144. Furthermore, if Western Europe wishes to
retain its deterrent power, it will have to move
more briskly than hitherto towards a combined
defensive potential which can be kept at a
credible level only insofar as it is collective. No
western goyernment will be able to convince
public opinion in its own country that detente
does not allow military expenditure to be
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reduced. Co-operation is therefore required more
than ever if the necessary effort is to be made at
the least cost. Reactivated WEU is the natural
framework for the governments to consider this
matter, the IEPG being that in which
co-operation can be usefully carried out, but
these means must be used effectively, which
hardly seems to have been the case so far. With
this in mind, Mr. Chevdnement, French Minister
of Defence, addressing the first European session
on armaments on l9th April 1989, proposed
adopting the following guidelines for such
co-operation: co-ordinated planning of long-term
military requirements, co-ordination of research
and co-operation between armaments industries.
These correspond to the conclusions which the
Assembly drew from its colloquy on European
co-operation in armaments research and devel-
opment held in London on 7th and 8th March
1988.
145. If Europe wishes to avoid decisions on
these matters, which concern the deterrent will
and capability of the United States, and hence of
the alliance, being taken without it being con-
sulted, it would seem urgent for it to reflect and
express its views on what it expects of the
alliance during the period ahead in which arms
limitation is becoming the major element of ajoint security policy. It is in this area first that
the WEU Council should be asked to play an
important r61e in the coming months and it is
regrettable that it has not yet tackled the matter
in a more clear-cut manner.
146. It is obvious that the new Soviet policy
will mean the Western European countries rede-
fining their entire policy towards Eastern Europe,
which will involve at one and the same time the
activities of the Council of Europe, with par-
ticular regard to human rights and the free
movement of persons and ideas, and the eco-
nomic responsibilities of the European Com-
munity since it is here that the Soviet Union
and its allies have made the most specific
demands.
147. Referring to the lines to be followed in the
context of the development of the movement
towards European union, Mr. Scholz, then
Federal German Minister of Defence, gave his
views during a lecture to the Fondation du futur
in Paris on 9th February 1989, as follows:
"... We must not hide the fact that the
road to a European security union is
strewn with difficulties, starting with the
question whether the European Com-
munity should be the basis for a European
security union. The question arises mainly
for the very reason that the European
Community is starting, in its economic
achievements and economic integration
action, to be increasingly attractive to
neutral European states and also 
- 
as I
have already mentioned 
- 
to Eastern Euro-
pean countries. In other words, the Euro-
pean Community must open its doors as
wide as possible to these states and peoples
so as to preserve the chances ofcreating a
true peaceful order in Europe, a global
framework for peaceful coexistence in
Europe, a framework allowing fuller sym-
biosis and integration ofall the European
peoples to the greatest extent possible.
Furthermore, the process of European
union must not jeopardise the security
policy and joint security essential to the
West. The process of European union
must never go against the North Atlantic
Alliance any more than WE-U, which,
moreover, is not to be feared. On the con-
trary, it is precisely the wide range of insti-
tutional links, communities and alliances
which exist in the West that allows us to
tackle in a suitable manner the aim of the
European security union and to give it afirst structure. In other words, the
European security union must be built on
the basis of WEU and WEU must remain
the only body for consultations on joint
European security policy. "
148. It is indeed certain that the Soviet Union
is concerned about the emergence ofa European
entity. After having opposed the European Com-
munity, sometimes yery actively, for thirty years,
the Soviet Union and its allies have adopted a
completely new attitude. They have recognised
the existence of the Community and have
developed means of dealing with it in matters
within its purview. They have accepted the
prospect of rapprochement between certain
neutral countries, such as Austria, and the Com-
munity and showed no hostile reactions when
Hungary started to develop its relations with it.
Similarly, in 1987 the Soviet Union invited a
delegation from the WEU Assembly. However,
the Warsaw Pact countries cannot maintain the
same kind of relations with an organisation that
has mainly economic responsibilities which is an
important partner in the transformation of their
own economies, and with an organisation whose
responsibilities relate mainly to security matters
and which has to defend Western Europe's own
interests in this area. To link defence Europe too
closely with economic Europe would probably
make the development of East-West relations
more difficult.
149. The evolution of Soviet external policy
seems to provide an opportunity to place inter-
national peace, and above all peace in Europe,
on new bases that no one would have dared hope
for when Mr. Gorbachev came to power less
than four years ago. For the first time, disarm-
ament can become a reality because the condi-
tions for restoring confidence are at last
emerging. For the first time, too, the iron curtain
which was lowered on the centre of Europe in the
26
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aftermath of the second world war seems about
to rise and the organisation of a freer, more open
society is taking shape round the CSCE.
150. As matters now stan4 it is probably an
advantage that Western Europe has institutions
with separate responsibilities, procedures and
memberihip, because they allow it to tackle the
problems raised by Mr. Gorbachev, when he
iefers to a common house, through appropriate
channels and to avoid being faced with the
impossible choice between structuring peace in
Europe, security requirements and the need to
unite its forces.
151. Your Rapporteur believes that, in present
circumstances, there are thrce possible aspects to
the common European house. The first is the
pursuit and extension of arms limitation agree-
ments. The Soviet Union and the West seem to
share the essential aim of attaining a'reasonable
sufficiency' on each side to allow a subsequelt
concomitant reduction ensuring security for both
sides. Disagreement on the need for deterrence is
perhaps more semantic than real since the
precise aim ofSoviet defence policy is to deter a
potential aggressor. In any case, it is not-liable to
prevent agreement on the first stages of disarm-
ament. The main discussion will be about the
appropriate time to tacHe the question of short-
range nuclear weapons, and this is probably an
area in which compromises are possible.
152' The second factor is the dialogue that is
essential for the restoration of mutual confi-
dence. A dialogue without effective disarmament
would admittedly be illusory but disarmament
without dialogue would be of little significance.
It is clear that Eastern Europe has a very great
desire to develop a dialogue that has already
been simmering for several years at various
levels. Glasnosi and the progress of public
freedom, inter alia for elections, foster this type
of exchange and the West must henceforth prove
materially and intellectually prepared to support
it. This applies in particular to our Assembly and
the exchanges it now conducts with the Supreme
Soviet.
153. The third factor is co-operation. This is
still limited because of remaining uncertainty
about the achievement of perestroika. The
re-emergence of confidence is certainl-y 
-a nec-
essary adunct to co-operation but it is for the
eastern countries to decide to what extent they
accept increased exchanges, the free circulation
of Currencies, indebtedness and many other
aspects of international economic agtivity which
they have long refused and to which they are
now having difficulry in adapting themselves.
154. However, co-operation is not limited to
the economy. Some aspects are already to be
seen in peace action in the United Nations.
Probablybthers will quickly emerge, for instance
in the fipot against calamities the world over, be
they naiural disasters, pollution of the -land or
sea-environment or, as the Chairman of the com-
mittee stressed the fight against terrorism'
155. It would seem that the door is now open
for rapid developments in these three areas if the
Soviei Union's intentions are confirmed and the
still vague concept of a common house can take
shape, if not with immediate building work, at
bait with the preparation of an architect's plan
and the digging of foundations. It is to this that
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